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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to investigate the short- and long-term socio-economic impact of the First 
Punic War on Carthage and its people. It will do so by exploring three parts of the Carthaginian 
political and socio-economic system during the fourth through the second centuries BCE. The first 
is its navy, and specifically the costs – in both material and man – of its use. This will be the subject 
of the first chapter. The second analyses the additional expenditures which the war extracted from 
Carthage, such as the outlays to recruit, maintain, and provide for the land army. The final chapter 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 Scholarly investigation of Carthage and the Punic Wars has, to date, tended to be 
concentrated in scope. Carthage itself frequently appears as an object of study in several works 
about the ancient Mediterranean, and is certainly prominent in works dealing specifically with the 
Phoenicians. Yet while these particular works offer useful analysis of the precise use of the word 
“Punic” and when it came into being, and often provide enlightening commentary on the ways in 
which Carthaginians diverged culturally from their Phoenician forebears, they rarely focus on the 
history of Carthage itself. Regarding the Punic Wars, the vast historiography of the conflict 
between Rome and the North African city-state consists primarily of books focusing on the former; 
if they involve the latter, the attention is predominantly on Hannibal, not Carthage itself. Three of 
the more successful narrative histories of the Punic Wars published in recent years include Dexter 
Hoyos’ Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War, Adrian Goldsworthy’s The Fall of 
Carthage, and Carthage Must be Destroyed by Richard Miles.  
While these monographs have helped establish a broader recognition of Carthage in the 
overall landscape of ancient Mediterranean history, neither they nor more focused studies have 
specifically addressed the issue of how the Punic Wars transformed the socio-economic structure 
and relations of Carthage. The primary aim of my thesis is thus to further add to scholarly 
investigations into ancient Carthage by concentrating on the economic organization of the state, 
and from that discussion gain a deeper understanding of the costs of the First Punic War on 
Carthage.  
2 
1.1 Historiography: Primary Sources1 
The way that historians have approached the First and Second Punic Wars has largely been 
based on the literary accounts of the Greeks and the Romans. This is because no Carthaginian 
primary sources of these wars are extant, and as a consequence, modern scholars are reliant on 
accounts which are to varying degrees biased in favor of the Romans, even if one of them - 
Polybius - consulted Philinos of Agrigentum - who championed the Punic cause.2 These Greek 
and Roman sources vary in length and in coverage of the wars. For the first war, the historian must 
rely almost solely upon Polybius whose extant account starts at the beginning of the first book of 
the Histories. Book Two, chapters 1-36, recounts the recovery of the Carthaginians from their 
defeat in the First Punic War up through their subsequent establishment of their power in Spain. 
The Second Punic War is also described by Polybius, as well as by Livy, whose History of Rome 
(books 21-30) provides a more complete chronicle.3 Because of the fragmentary condition of 
Polybius’ Histories, it is necessary to use Livy’s History of Rome books 21-30 for the bulk of the 
Second Punic War. Livy tends to follow Polybius fairly closely for this portion of history.  
Diodorus Siculus, a Greek writer based in Sicily in the first century BCE, also discusses 
the First and Second Punic Wars in Volume XI of his Library of History, though most of his texts 
are fragmentary. Diodorus compiles information from multiple ancient authors (including 
Polybius), which is one reason his account can be beneficial. Additionally, Appian of Alexandria 
devotes book 7 of his Roman History to the Second Punic War. Examining Diodorus and Appian 
                                                 
1 It should be observed here that whenever possible the Loeb version of ancient texts will be cited, mainly for 
ease of access and for consistency in pagination. 
2 Dexter Hoyos, Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2015), 
281. 
3 For Polybius, Books 7-11 cover the decade after Cannae (216-206) but exist only in a fragmentary condition. 
Books 13-33 cover the next fifty-four years (206-152) yet few fragments survive. 
3 
as well as Polybius and Livy allows an historian to develop a more complete perspective of the 
Punic Wars.  
1.2 Historiography: Secondary Sources 
Two books, the edited volume The Phoenicians by Sabatino Moscati and The Phoenicians 
and the West: Politics, Colonies, and Trade by Maria Eugenia Aubet, go far in providing a view 
of Carthage from the beginning.4 As the titles of these texts indicate, the Carthaginians were 
originally Phoenicians, a group of people who hailed from the shores of the Levant (specifically, 
Tyre). The legend of the foundation of their state – the famous tale of Dido/Elissa, her flight across 
the Mediterranean, and her clever stratagem to acquire land from the Numidians – all point to a 
certain flair for sharp bargaining which lend to the Phoenicians an ancient reputation of being 
skilled in the art of the deal.5 Indeed, like their Phoenician ancestors who were cunning enough 
navigators to be able to sail the open seas at night with the help of astronomy, the Carthaginians 
were superb mariners, and were craftsmen and merchants par excellence.6  Yet these sources make 
clear that in some ways Carthage was also distinct from other Phoenician communities. If, as 
Aubet argues, the Phoenicians owed their growth and expansion to economic factors, it can be 
argued that their Carthaginian descendants may have “owed her growth to defensive and political 
rather than commercial criteria.”7 Carthage corresponded to a new type of Phoenician foundation, 
being intended not only as a refuge for fugitives from Tyre and Cyprus, but also as an obstruction 
to the advance of Greek trade in the west. According to Aubet, this latter motive would explain 
                                                 
4Sabatino Moscati. The Phoenicians. New York: Abbeville Press, 1988; Maria E. Aubet. The Phoenicians and 
the West: Politics, Colonies, and Trade. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
5Aubet, 163; Moscati, 57 (who notes there is a play on words associated with this story. The acropolis of Carthage 
was called Byrsa. The Greek version of this word, bursa, means “ox-hide”). 
6Aubet, 166. 
7Aubet, 228. This may even be able to be applied to the Punic Wars since the Carthaginians were able to pay off 
their war debt in 10 years by mining the Spanish lands for precious metals 
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the foundation in Ibiza, which closed the Straits of Gibraltar to any enemy ship coming from the 
Mediterranean.8 It is precisely this Greek threat that provided the impetus to develop a military 
policy and to lay the foundations of the Carthaginian naval empire.9 In fact, Carthaginian 
obstruction to Greek trade led to war between the two in Sicily in the sixth century, whose success 
led to a greatly expanded sphere of influence for the Carthaginians. It also gradually paved the 
way for the decline of Greek influence in the area, leaving Rome and Carthage as the remaining 
powers in the region. Thus, although the Romans and Carthaginians would strike up a formal treaty 
around 509, which was renewed and modified on three separate occasions, continued expansion 
by both states would eventually lead to a point that the growth of one would have to come at the 
expense of the other.10 
As might be expected from a state with such wide-ranging interests, the Carthaginians were 
certainly not strangers to war for expansion or for protection. In The Phoenicians, Piero 
Bartoloni’s “Ships and Navigation” chapter states that the Carthaginians were masters of the sea 
at the beginning of the Punic Wars.11  In this regard they far outstripped the Romans, so much so 
that during the First Punic War the Romans resorted to constructing their fleet using a Carthaginian 
ship that had gone aground and been captured.12 The Carthaginians, though they sailed their 
merchant vessels only during certain times of the year due to the difficult weather of the 
Mediterranean, may have kept warships on the sea year-round to patrol the coasts and suppress 
                                                 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
10Moscati, 62. 
11Piero Bartoloni, “Ships and Navigation” in Moscati The Phoenicians., 90.  
12 Polybius 1.20.16, Bartoloni, 90. An archaeological find – two Punic ships from the third century B.C.E. – has 
revealed that the craft were fully built of wooden components prefabricated separately and assembled later; if this is 
the case, it is not hard to understand how the Romans could have used the ship that went aground as a prototype for 
building their own ships very quickly. 
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piracy or, if in the midst of war, for whatever military operations were opportune.13 Importantly, 
the Carthaginian ships were manned by Carthaginian citizens.14 This was not the case with their 
land army (more below), and indicates the amount of importance the Carthaginians attached to 
naval matters.  
Though the Carthaginians manned their warships with citizens, they did not typically keep 
a standing army. According to Piero Bartoloni in his chapter “Army, Navy, and Warfare” in The 
Phoenicians, in early Carthage the nucleus of the army was likely made up of citizens in arms, 
who were supplemented by tributary allies and mercenaries. However, over time, these latter 
contingents became the main component of the force.15 This is likely due to the fact that, in the 
early stages of colonization, large armies were inappropriate and unnecessary; the Phoenicians’ 
relationship with the peoples of the Mediterranean coast was based on trade, and Phoenician 
colonists did not have sufficient manpower to permit them to expand through aggression.16 The 
Carthaginians were more familiar with expansion through aggression than were the Phoenicians, 
though. During their early years, they managed to subjugate the Libyans and incorporate the 
Phoenician cities into their “empire”. Yet most of the Carthaginian aggression was not dedicated 
to acquiring more territory, but instead to maintaining control of the territory they already 
possessed. In this way, the Carthaginians had a different relationship with war than the more 
populous Roman state had.  
                                                 
13 Though Bartoloni states this with certainty, Lazenby and Hoyos have a different opinion; they both suggest 
that the season for war making on the sea was from March (at the earliest) to September, the other months being too 
dangerous for seafaring (if the weather was too difficult for seafaring, the amount of piracy would likely have been 
reduced as well). They then stored the ships in shipsheds during the winter. This would also have allowed the ships 
to dry out(CITATION) 
14 Bartoloni, “Ships and Navigation” in Moscati The Phoenicians, 89. However, Hoyos argues that the large 
armaments required for 100-200 warships probably called for more crews than Carthage alone could furnish and must 
have drawn from the Libyphoenicians as well. Dexter Hoyos, Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War, 
(Oxford University Press: New York, 2015), 22.  
15Piero Bartoloni, “Army, Navy, and Warfare” in Moscati, The Phoenicians. 161. 
16Bartoloni, 160.  
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During the fourth century BCE, the Carthaginians maintained a standing army on Sicily. 
They also maintained a citizen army. This did not last for long; in 340 BCE the Carthaginian army 
– consisting of a large contingent of citizen troops – was ambushed by Timoleon. In the course of 
the battle at the Krimisos River in Sicily, according to Diodorus (page numbers), the Carthaginians 
encountered a thick mist which hid the enemy as they waited to ambush the unsuspecting 
Carthaginians. When the fog lifted and the Syracusans saw the Carthaginians crossing the river, 
they were determined to take out the crack battalion – the Sacred Band, Carthage’s elite citizen 
regiment, distinguishable by their white shields, heavy bronze and iron armor, and the ordered 
discipline of their march – first. Timoleon sent down his cavalry to catch them before they got out 
of the river. The Carthaginian line was broken; many were trampled and drowned in the river. The 
Sacred Band stood their ground, and the 2000 elite Carthaginians perished in the struggle. This 
battle represented the worst military disaster that the Carthaginians suffered in Sicily with 10,000 
Carthaginian soldiers killed and 15,000 captured.17 A contingent of the army made up solely of 
native-born Carthaginians was afterward never one the Carthaginians wished to put in harm’s way, 
and it was kept in reserve except in times of great danger.  
The Carthaginians became progressively more comfortable with trusting land battles to 
allies and mercenaries – as was discussed, their navy was crewed by citizen sailors – and the use 
of native troops was eventually phased out entirely in favor of recruits from areas known for the 
war-like character of their peoples. In the right hands, such soldiers could be devastatingly 
effective: Bartoloni notes that Hannibal was a master at using the particular assets of various 
peoples in his army, taking advantage of the wide variety of equipment, tactics, and skills to 
accomplish battlefield tasks in such a way that the more homogenous Roman army could not. By 
                                                 
17 Miles, (find page number – The Corinthian Threat) 
7 
way of illustration, Bartoloni notes that Hannibal used massed horsemen for their disruptive 
qualities rather than as elite troops.18 Hannibal’s skill in this and in all the other arts of combat 
made for an extremely long and devastating war with the Romans, one whose victory could not 
entirely conceal the many wounds sustained by both the countryside and the people. Some of these 
wounds had still not completely healed even sixty years after Zama, and were still a source of pain 
to Italy in the late second century.  
Though the previous two works provide a broad understanding of who the Carthaginians 
were, in order to examine the Punic Wars one must also understand the military engagements that 
helped established them as one of the major powers in the Mediterranean. Glenn Markoe’s studies 
of the Phoenicians provides significant insights into Carthage's military history and its acquisition 
of territory, revealing that the Carthaginians were recognized for their powerful navy as early as 
525 BCE. Illustrative is an episode from the sixth century, when, despite threat from the Persian 
ruler Cambyses, the Phoenicians at Tyre refused to lend their efforts to an attack against Carthage. 
Cambyses subsequently called off the attack, but as Markoe argues, the passage indicates the 
significant political and military position of Carthage already by the mid-sixth century.19 Indeed, 
on the collapse of Tyre (which was forced to submit to the Persians as a result of their refusal to 
fight), the sixth century saw Carthage begin an aggressive campaign of conquest and colonial 
expansion across the west Mediterranean, intervening militarily in both Sardinia and Sicily to 
attempt to safeguard Phoenician holdings there.20 Sicily held the key to Carthage's Aegean trade 
and Sardinia was essential to the protection of Carthage's hegemony on trade with the Western 
Mediterranean.21 It was the Greek cities Syracuse and Acragas - strategic harbors in Aegean Sea 
                                                 
18Bartoloni, 163. 
19 Glenn Markoe, Peoples of the Past: Phoenicians, (University of California Press: Berkley, 2000), 49. 
20 Markoe, 54. 
21 Markoe, 55.  
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transit - that prompted an ambitious expedition in 480 BCE with the goal of incorporating all of 
Sicily into the Carthaginian realm.22 Unfortunately for Carthage, she was soundly defeated at 
Himera and was forced to pay 20,000 silver talents in war reparations. For the time being, this 
ended Carthage's expansive tendencies in the eastern Mediterranean and shifted her focus to her 
territories in the Tunisian heartland and the western Mediterranean. Even so, by 409 BCE Carthage 
besieged and occupied the Greek city Selinus on the behalf of the Elymian city Segesta, which 
was involved in a protracted struggle with Selinus and its ally Syracuse, and then took Himera. In 
vengeance for the earlier Carthaginian defeat there, Himera was razed to the ground and never 
inhabited again.23 By 406 BCE, the Carthaginians controlled the entire Greek portion of Sicily 
except Syracuse itself, and though that did not last long - Syracuse began strengthening its military 
in preparation for a counter-attack on Motya as soon as Carthage withdrew in 405 - it led to an 
intermittent struggle with Syracuse over control of Sicily which lasted until territorial limits were 
established in 374 designating the River Halycus as a boundary. Carthage would retain this 
territory until the outbreak of war with Rome (see figure 1 for map of Carthage’s territory at the 
beginning of the First Punic War).24 
It is at this point in the history of the Carthaginians that my thesis begins. As far as the 
secondary literature, I am interested in the modern historiography of the First Punic War to the 
extent that such texts discuss the specific domestic ramifications of the combat itself. Given the 
enormous amount of attention the wars have received, my thesis will not and cannot delve into the 
complete history of the war nor provide commentary on all the secondary sources which do so. It 
can, however, analyze the secondary literature on the ramifications of the war at home, a 
                                                 
22 Markoe, 55.  
23 Markoe, 64. 
24 Markoe, 65.  
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phenomena that I believe to be understudied. Specifically, it seeks to investigate why it is that 
Carthage lost these wars so badly. Although there is nothing inherent in a side by side comparison 
of the military resources of Carthage and Rome that clearly indicates why Carthage was doomed 
to lose the war to Rome, they did lose. My contention is that two significant factors in the loss of 
the First Punic War were the substantial casualties sustained and debt accrued during these 
conflicts. Lucius Marcius Censorinus, one of the Roman consuls on the eve of the Third Punic 
War, is reported by Appian, an historian of the second century C.E., to have said that a maritime 
city is “more like a ship than like solid ground … tossed about on the waves of trouble and … 
exposed to the vicissitudes of life.”25 The comparison of Carthage to a ship helps provides clarity 
into exactly why the losses that occurred during the Punic Wars consisted of more than just the 
loss of land and naval battles, but affected practically all levels of Carthaginian society. Due to the 
nature of Carthage as a maritime empire built upon trade on the seas, losses in the Mediterranean 
meant major disruption. The sea was Carthage’s home.  
1.3 Outline of the Argument 
The central question of my thesis is: what was the short- and long-term socio-economic 
impact of the First Punic War on the Carthaginian state and people? I respond to this question by 
exploring three parts of the Carthaginian political and socio-economic system during the fourth 
through second centuries BCE: the personnel and labor invested in the navy; state expenditure on 
war-making; and the long-term ramifications of the wars on Carthage’s economic structure. These 
three different components of the Carthaginian socio-economic framework function as 
independent case-studies of how issues of state finance, the military, and social organization 
changed during the years 400 to 200 BCE, yet work together to provide a holistic representation 
                                                 
25 Appian, Pun. 86 
10 
of the impact of the Punic Wars on Carthage itself. They also form the basis of the three substantive 
chapters of my thesis as outlined below.   
The first chapter will focus on the Carthaginian navy. Carthage became a power in the 
Mediterranean as a result of her maritime excursions, both military and mercantile. The 
importance of the navy to the people of Carthage can be illustrated by Carthage’s grief at the 
burning of the ships in the harbor after the Second Punic War. According to Livy, “the sight of all 
those vessels suddenly bursting into flames caused as much grief to the people as if Carthage itself 
were burning.”26 However, understanding the importance of the Carthaginian navy to the people 
of Carthage requires delving into the questions that are not always asked, specifically about the 
way it was crewed. According to several secondary sources, the Carthaginian navy was crewed by 
citizens of Carthage.27 These sources do not footnote from where they obtained this information, 
and the primary sources do not state definitively that this is the case. This chapter will investigate 
the probability that the citizens of Carthage crewed the navy by examining the problems that this 
assertion poses, and then will assess the economic impact of this possibility on Carthage and her 
citizen body.28 Because evidence about Carthage is limited, it will be necessary to illuminate 
specific elements of the navy by comparing it with other Hellenistic era navies with which 
Carthage shared significant similarities.  
One issue that suggests that the Carthaginian navy was not composed of citizens is the 
amount of men required to supply rowers for the navy. Each quinquereme - the main ships that 
the Carthaginians used in their naval battles - could hold 300 rowers and 120 marines. A 
                                                 
26 Livy 30.43 
27 Hoyos, Bartoloni, Gold, etc. though Lazenby states that historians cannot know exactly how the Carthaginian 
Navy was crewed.  
28 It must be addressed here that I do not mean that the Carthaginian citizens were not involved in the crewing of 
the Navy - the navy, unlike the Carthaginian Army, did not consist of mercenaries.   
11 
Carthaginian fleet typically consisted of 100-200 warships, and thus approximately 30,000 to 
60,000 men. These men were not slaves, though slaves did work in the shipyards and harbors.29  
According to Strabo, by 264 BCE, the city itself housed some 200,000 citizens and foreigners.30 
If the numbers above are correct, this would mean that approximately a third of Carthage’s citizens 
crewed her navy (only if the numbers include men and not women and children). W.W. Tarn 
suggests that Carthage limited the number of ships in her fleets to 200 per battle due to a lack of 
manpower to crew them, which would certainly be true if a third of the population was used to 
crew the ships. 31 In fact, it is unlikely that Carthage supplied her rowers from only her citizen 
body. Dexter Hoyos suggests that the city relied on its Libyphoenician kin to help supply both 
rowers and ships.32 Yet even with Libyphoenician assistance, a crew consisting of only fifty 
Carthaginians (and thus numbering 5,000 to 10,000 men) would still represent a huge amount of 
men that would have shaped the economic structure of Carthage (and the city’s surrounding 
subject states) in various ways. In the first five years of naval battles of the First Punic War 
(beginning with the Battle of the Lipari Islands in 260 BCE and ending with the Battle of Ecnomus 
in 256 BCE), the Carthaginians lost approximately 85,000 men -killed or captured - and 189 ships, 
tabulations which consider those ships lost in battles, not those lost to storms or other such natural 
phenomena.33 The number represents a large loss of men – whether they were all citizens or 
included a mix of Carthaginians and Libyphoenicians – though accounting for how many were 
                                                 
29 Lionel Casson, 1966. “Galley Slaves”. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 
Vol. 97, 35–44. 
30 Hoyos, Mastering the West, 15. (Tarn states 3 to 4 million people in Carthage by the battle of Ecnomus from J. 
Beloch, Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt and Die Bevölkerung Italiens im Altertum in Beiträge zur 
Alten Geschichte) 
31 W.W. Tarn, 1907. “The Fleets of the First Punic War” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 27. The Society for the 
Promotion of Hellenic Studies: 48–60.  
32 Hoyos, Mastering the West, 22. 
33 This is assuming that the Carthaginians made use of the 17 Roman ships that they captured at Lipari. If not, the 
number rises to 206. 
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killed, captured, or exchanged as prisoners of war is difficult to determine. The financial loss is 
clearer: the loss and replacement of 189 ships entailed significant costs, as did the repair of others 
that were damaged.  
A navy was not a one-time investment, but was, rather an ongoing expense. Ships which 
were captured or sunk would have needed to be replaced, and even ships that were not damaged 
in battle required maintenance. The financial demands of the navy were most evident in relation 
to the payment of the crews. Though it is impossible to know exactly what the crews were paid, 
by using data from classical Athens – a state that was analogous to third century Carthage in terms 
of population size, territorial extent, and basic governmental principles, such as the existence of 
an Assembly, citizen votes, and the political leadership of an oligarchy – one can get a pretty good 
idea. However, war was expensive, particularly when conducted at the very large scale that was 
necessitated by the Punic Wars. The building of ships, their manning, the payment of their crews, 
and their maintenance made up only one sector of Carthaginian state expenditure during the Punic 
Wars; there were many others, the best documented of which are addressed in my second data 
chapter, “The Costs of the Punic Wars on Carthage.” This chapter specifically examines monetary 
costs of the war (such as supplies and mercenary payments, as well as the human capital costs). 
The requirements of supplies for the armies were very large: not only did the Carthaginians have 
to supply food and water for their soldiers, they also had to supply food for their elephants and for 
the servant entourages that accompanied the armies. Though many scholars do not investigate the 
cost of the war because it is assumed that war is expensive, it is imperative in this thesis to examine 
what the costs were in order to assess the enormity of the monetary impact on Carthage.  
How were the Carthaginians able to afford a war of this magnitude? Ancient writers such 
as Aristotle, Polybius, and Diodorus suggest that the Carthaginians obtained some of their supplies 
13 
in the form of tribute from their subject states. Each state contributed a certain amount of “tribute” 
either in coin or kind for the benefit of Carthage (and in exchange for military protection from 
Carthage should they need to be defended). Carthage also likely levied revenue by means of heavy 
agricultural taxes on the Libyan hinterland as well as custom dues, port taxes, litanies, and loans 
from citizens.34  
In my third chapter, I examine the impact of the joint accumulation of these expenses along 
with the political circumstances of the Wars on the overall economic structure and health of the 
Carthaginian state and population. The chapter considers some of the ways by which Carthage 
tried to mitigate the financial burdens imposed by the war, drawing on methods as far-ranging as 
the seeking of foreign loans, paying soldiers on retainer, and debasement of the currency. In the 
wake of the First Punic War, for example, Carthage attempted to take out a loan from Egypt to 
help pay its mercenaries, but was denied by Ptolemy II who claimed friendship with both Carthage 
and Rome and did not want to offend Rome.35 Carthage also attempted to short-change its 
mercenaries, an event that led to a mercenary revolt and the arming of the civilian population in 
order to put it down.  
The coinage of Carthage particularly exhibits the shortage of funds. Coins minted during 
the First Punic and Mercenary Wars show a decrease in the electrum and gold; pure metal content 
fell from ninety-eight percent in the fourth century to thirty percent in the Second Punic War.36 
Similar patterns appear in the silver coinage as well: the silver content of Punic coins fell to thirty-
three percent after the First Punic War and from fifteen to twenty-three percent after the Libyan 
                                                 
34 Hoyos, Mastering the West, 142.  
35 Lazenby, The First Punic War, 29.  
36 Christopher Howgego, Approaching the Ancient World: Ancient History from Coins (Routledge: 
London,1995), 113. 
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revolt.37 It is important to note that this decrease in electrum was not applicable for the money paid 
to Rome because that money was not paid in coinage, but was instead paid by a talent-weight of 
gold or silver. As the city became more and more financially impoverished after the end of the 
Second Punic War, Carthage began minting huge copper coins and billons with less that twenty-
five percent silver.38 
The scarcity of money had an especially strong impact on Carthage’s ability to supply the 
navy, as mentioned earlier and as was most evident in the last battle of the First Punic War. 
Carthage required nine months between the arrival of the Romans outside Drepana and the final 
battle of the Aegates Islands, off the coast of Sicily. Polybius attributes the delay to Carthage’s 
neglect of its navy after the Battle of Drepana, which had happened five years earlier.39 Since, 
however, the ships sent to Drepana were loaded with supplies for the city under siege, it was not 
so much the recruitment of new sailors for the navy that necessitated the long wait, but more likely 
the arrangement of supplies (owing to the paucity of resources). By examining the last few battles 
of the First Punic War, the Carthaginian’s economic situation becomes clearer.  
The Carthaginian navy was devastated by the loss of the Battle of the Aegates Islands. 
Their situation may have improved over the course of the late third century BCE, based on 
Carthage’s ability to build two artificial harbors that together would hold an entire fleet; even so, 
however, the focus of the state on domestic harbors that could be easily defended (and supplied) 
suggests a pressing financial motivation to keep the navy both close to home and on a smaller 
scale. In fact, it is reasonably clear that Carthage never fully recovered in the interim between the 
First and Second Punic Wars. The sources imply that a lack of ships hindered the redevelopment 
                                                 
37 Ibid.  
38 Billons were alloys of gold or silver with a greater proportion of another metal, such as copper, used in making 
coins. 
39 Polybius 1.61.1-9 
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of Carthaginian forces until the decade after 218 at the earliest.40 Even then, Carthaginian 
hegemony over the seas was never restored, and its navy was a relatively pale shadow of what it 
had been just two generations earlier: according to Polybius, only 17 Punic ships defended Spain 
from the Romans during the time of Scipio’s campaign, 41 and no major sea battles mark the 
historical narratives of the Second Punic War.  
The research undertaken suggests that the socioeconomic repercussions of the First Punic 
War on the state and citizenry of Carthage was extensive and felt in many different sectors. Based 
on this research, I will argue in this thesis that the impact can be seen most clearly in the areas 
identified above: the Carthaginian navy, state expenditures as related to war-making, and the short- 
and long-term ramifications of the wars on Carthage’s economic structure and the shifts in 
Carthaginian socioeconomic organization that resulted from these ramifications. By conducting a 
close examination of the historical sources for Carthage in the era of the First and Second Punic 
Wars, this Master’s thesis aims to contribute a new dimension to the growing body of scholarship 
on Carthage, the ancient economy, and the role of Phoenico-Punic civilization in the historical 
framework of the Classical and Hellenistic Mediterranean.  
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41 Ibid.  
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Figure 1: Carthaginian Empire before the First Punic War 264 BCE 
 
2     THE CARTHAGINIAN NAVY AND ITS CREWS 
It is something of a commonplace among ancient historians that the first war between the 
Romans and Carthaginians—the First Punic War-- was a matter of a quintessential land power 
against a dominant naval one. However, the actual performance of the Carthaginian army against 
that of the Romans in that war does not show it as helpless before the ever-victorious legions, nor 
did the Roman navy entirely acquit itself all that poorly before the squadrons of the Punic fleet. A 
more balanced view of the battles in the First Punic War reveals that the naval supremacy of 
Carthage did not spare the city from profound maritime losses, a fact that much of the scholarship 
about the Punic Wars – which tends to be focused primarily on Rome and the outcome of battles 
and wars on the Empire – does not always recognize. Correcting this oversight is important, 
however, because, as was discussed in the Introduction, the expenses encumbered by Carthage in 
the upkeep of its navy and military forces during the First Punic War dramatically shaped the city-
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state’s broader political economy and its ability to endure further military stress in the late second 
and first centuries BCE.  
This chapter will attempt to quantify more sharply the economic impact of the First Punic 
War by focusing on what the ancient sources recognize was one of Carthage’s heaviest financial 
burdens: its navy. I concentrate on three main measures of “cost”: salary payments for the naval 
crew members, expenses sustained in ship building and upkeep, and estimated losses of both 
property and life as a result of naval combat.  
 
2.1 Manning the Navy: Composition of the Crews and Salary Payments 
A navy, obviously, consists of ships. During the First Punic War, most of the vessels that 
composed the Carthaginian fleet were quinqueremes, essentially rowed torpedoes, whose crews 
provided the power to ram – and by this means sink – enemy vessels. Polybius observes that each 
quinquereme could hold 420 men, 300 of whom were rowers and the other 120, marines (Polybius 
1.26.7). The rowers consisted of the men who were responsible for physically moving the ship, 
whereas the marines consisted of the men who fought on the decks during the battles at sea. Lionel 
Casson has suggested that these numbers should not be taken as airtight, but should rather be seen 
as “a loose expression” of the composition of the crew.42 For one thing, Carthaginian 
quinqueremes may have carried as few as 40 marines; the figure of 120 may have been a maximum 
number of marines applied to ships that favored boarding rather than ramming. Since ramming 
was the primary Carthaginian strategy during naval combat, the number of marines carried on 
Carthaginian ships was likely fewer than what is suggested by Polybius’ account.43  
                                                 
42 Lionel Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), 105 n 41. 
43 J.F. Lazenby, The First Punic War: A military history, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 28. 
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Furthermore, the 300 “rowers” may not necessarily have been strictly oarsmen.44 An 
Athenian trireme during the fourth century carried 16 officers, rates, deckhands, and other 
personnel above the 170 rowers; since a quinquereme had essentially the same rig, it would have 
needed approximately the same number of non-rowing, non-marine personnel.45 However, 
according to John Morrison, the non-rowing personnel of the Athenian trireme can also be 
compared to those on a Rhodian quadrireme.46 But the quadrireme had 45 members of the deck 
crew, not including the marines, where the trireme had only thirty – most likely because more 
officers were needed to improve the communication on the bigger ship.47 Because the quinquereme 
is a bigger ship than the quadrireme, and because there is more information to be passed along to 
the crew of the quadrireme, it makes more sense to assume that the crew of the quinquereme was 
even more similar to a Rhodian quadrireme than to an Athenian trireme. This is important because 
it implies that larger numbers of skilled men would have been required to crew the quinquereme 
than were required to crew the trireme. Due to the level of skill required, these men, or at least the 
officers and skilled rowers, could not have been gathered from the streets of Carthage, but instead 
had to be men who had experience on the sea and, more importantly, on warships.48  
The skill of the officers and lead rowers was essential to the precise maneuvers required to 
conduct a successful ramming attack. Communication and coordination within the ship needed to 
                                                 
44 Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 105 n 41. 
45 Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 105. 
46Morrison, Greek and Roman Oared Warships, 349.  
47 The trireme, quadrireme, and quinquereme were warships that all fit into a larger category of ships known as 
polyremes. The trireme had three banks of oars with one man per oar. The quadrireme, according to Casson, had two 
banks of oars with two men on each oar (and most likely fewer oars), and the quinquereme (the Carthaginian 
quinquereme, because the early Roman quinquereme was designed differently), had either three banks of oars with 
two rowers in the first, two in the second, and one in the third row or two banks of oars with three rowers in one row 
and two in the other row, with the first design being more likely. Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 305. 
48 Though on the quinquereme, there were some positions that could have been filled by unskilled rowers, due to 
the requirement of complex maneuvers used frequently like the diekplous which required a knowledge sailing to 
complete, it is unlikely that the majority of the rowers would have consisted of subsistence farmers. 
19 
be disciplined.49 Based on the crews of Rhodian quadrireme, the titles and positions of the officers 
were as follows: the trierarchos, or trierarch, who generally served as captain and could also, in a 
smaller unit, command a flotilla; the epiplous, or vice-captain, who was the officer assigned as 
captain when the trierarch chose not to take personal command, or was aboard the flagship of a 
flotilla; the grammateus, whose name literally means “clerk” or “secretary” was an important 
officer who had a close rapport with the trierarch or epiplous;and the kybernetes, or executive 
officer and navigating officer, who was stationed on the poop deck.50 Other officers included the 
prorates, or bow officer, who in the Rhodian navy seems to have ranked just below the kybernetes, 
as well as the keleustes, or chief rowing officer, and the pentekontarchos, probably the assistant 
rowing officer. Then there were the ratings - trained technical personnel separate from the rowers 
- who were responsible for the well-being of the people on the ship and the ship itself. Ratings 
included the hegemon ton ergon, the chief of all activities who was responsible for the activities 
of the deckhands; the naupegos, the ship’s carpenter; the pedaliouchos, or quartermaster 
responsible for holding the steering oar; the eliaochreistes, who was in charge of issuing oil to the 
crew for rubbing down; the kopodetes, whose prime duty was to check the chafing gear and the 
straps of the oars, but who was probably responsible for the oars in general; and the iatros, or 
ship’s doctor, who in the Rhodian navy was generally a foreigner.51 The seamen (included in the 
non-rowing personnel, but responsible for the movement of the ship) included the ergazomenoi en 
prora, of whom there were at least five and who worked at the prow, watching over the bow deck, 
and handling the sails and lines. The seamen also included five ergazomenoi en prymne, who 
worked at the poop deck and were responsible for the stern deck watch and the handling of sails 
                                                 
49Louis Rawlings, “The Carthaginian Navy: Questions and Assumptions” in New Perspectives on Ancient 
Warfare, eds. Garrett G. Fagan, and Matthew Trundle, (Brill: Leiden, 2010) 280. 
50 Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 307. 
51 Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 308. 
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and lines. Other non-rowing personnel members were the katapeltaphetai or catapult operators, of 
whom there were at least two; the toxotai or archers, of whom there were at least six; and the 
ephibatai or marines, of whom there were at least 19 on the quadrireme. Finally, though not 
mentioned for all the Greek navies, at least some ships were also manned with, toicharchoi or side 
chiefs, who were the thranite (top) rowers nearest the stern on port and starboard respectively, 
auletes (flautists) or trieraules (pipers), responsible for piping the time after the keleustes had set 
the stroke, and nauphylakes or ship guards.52 The requirement of so many different officer 
positions on the quadrireme and trireme illustrates the amount of communication and skill 
necessary to conduct naval battles in the ancient world. A ship was not merely stocked with men 
who could row, but with skilled men who each had a job during battle. 
All of the mariners on the quadrireme and trireme were essential for battles, even the 
ergazomenoi en prora and the ergazomenoi en prymne (those responsible for handling the sails). 
Though during a fight warships were usually moved by oars alone with the sailing gear stowed 
away before battle (or even left on the shore),53 a battle could require the restoration of sailing gear 
(Polybius 1.61.7), either for direct flight to escape overwhelming odds, or to provide propulsion if 
too many of the oars had been damaged (and certainly ships would occasionally attempt to run a 
parallel course to the enemy to try and shear off his oars).54 In these cases, either the removed sails 
would have to be reset or a second rig (which could have been kept on the ship at all times for 
emergencies) would need to be brought out, each task being accomplished swiftly and by non-
rowing personnel.55 If the quinquereme had the same rig as the trireme (and the quadrireme), it 
could not have had fewer deck crew members than that type of ship, and may have had more. 
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Some of the 300 “rowers” mentioned by Polybius were more likely part of this aeolian crew. Yet, 
the stress on the officer positions in the Carthaginian navy should not take away from the necessity 
that even the rowers required a competence at sea and what this requirement meant for Carthage.  
To be a sailor in the Carthaginian navy required some degree of skill; rowers had to execute 
intricate maneuvers, for which a measure of dexterity would have been required. These men were 
not slaves, though slaves did work in the shipyards and harbors.56 Not being slaves, members of 
the navy were, in all probability, financially compensated in some way. Indeed, payment of ship 
crews is well established in the evidence for other Hellenistic-era navies. According to Louis 
Rawlings in The Ancient Greeks at War, the Athenian rowers, in good times, could receive as 
much as a drachma per day.57 Carthage was renowned for paying its mercenaries high rates of pay, 
and it is likely that it did the same for the crews of its warships.58 If it is assumed that there were 
300 men per quinquereme (exclusive of marines) with a standard complement of 200 
quinqueremes per fleet,59 at one drachma per day per man, the fleet would cost Carthage at least 
10 talents per day, 300 talents per month, and 3,600 talents per year. Of course, maintenance of a 
fleet during the off-season would have been particularly wasteful, and it is likely that the 
campaigning season only stretched from May to September, after which the crews were released.60 
If this was the case, then the cost would have been a slightly less staggering sum of 1500 talents 
per year instead of 3600. This already-large price-tag would not have included the marine 
                                                 
56 Casson is fairly adamant that slaves were not used as rowers in the navy and has much evidence to back up his 
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59 W. W. Tarn, "The Fleets of the First Punic War." The Journal of Hellenic Studies 27, 1907: 48. 
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contingents, though; working with a minimum complement of 40 marines per ship, these would 
have added a minimum of 200 talents per annum to the upkeep.61 This figure is computed on the 
cost basis of marines requiring the same pay as rowers. However, their equivalence was, in reality, 
not valid; in Classical Athens, a marine normally had the same status as an infantryman, which 
was appreciably higher than that of a rower.62 Such differences in status suggests that the 
Carthaginian marine likely was paid more than one drachma per day. Also, it may have been the 
case that Carthaginian trierarchs paid more for good crewmen, which would help explain Polybius’ 
citation of specific good crewmanship from particular ships. For instance, in the First Punic War, 
Hannibal ‘the Rhodian’s’ ship was worthy of note (Polybius 1.46.1-13). Though the ship itself was 
a very fine vessel (the Romans used it as a model for the new ships that they constructed), it must 
have been crewed very well, because it took a specially-chosen Roman crew sailing on another 
previously-seized Carthaginian quadrireme to capture it (Polybius 1.47.8). In the same vein, rates 
of pay among Athenian crewmen were not flat, but depended on the status and rank of the 
crewman.63 Some men could cost more than a drachma per day, adding to the cost. Pay could also 
vary from ship to ship, with the trierarchs paying over the norm to get good crewmen.64 
Based on the primary sources, rowing was a full time occupation, at least in powerful 
ancient city-states like Athens or Rhodes. This most likely applied to oarsmen of Carthage as 
well.65 Piero Bartoloni asserts that “Warships … travelled all the year round, to patrol the coasts 
and suppress piracy, or in the event of wars already being waged, for whatever military operations 
were opportune.”66 Given the cost involved, patrolling warships did not likely represent the whole 
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fleet. And if the crews were only on the ships during the peak season, it stands to reason that they 
may have had an occupation or farmstead to which to turn in the off-season. Polybius alludes to 
how at least some of the navy may have worked “part-time” in his account of the last naval battle 
of the First Punic War, that of the Aegates Islands (1.61.4-5). For that battle, he notes that that the 
crews were “quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency” because “owing to 
their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them again, [the Carthaginians] 
had, in contempt for [the Romans], neglected their naval force.” This probably means less that the 
Carthaginians scrapped their navy and more that they dismissed its sailors during slow periods, 
with “untrained” probably meaning that the crews had had an insufficient period of 
(re)familiarization and not gotten back into shape, even if men who had more experience would 
reach that point faster.67 With the exception of this battle, Polybius is always complimentary about 
the crews of the Carthaginian fleets and, at one point, attributes their skill to the “seamanship 
[which] had long been their national calling” and the fact that “they occupied themselves with the 
sea more than any other people.”68 The disrepair of the navy at Aegates must therefore have been 
substantial to draw such a commentary from the otherwise laudatory author.  
Yet even if seamanship was the national calling of the Carthaginians, the question remains: 
from where did the Carthaginians recruit the crews for their navy? Most secondary sources suggest 
that the Carthaginian navy was crewed by citizens, while the army, as is well known, was 
composed of mercenaries.69 Ancient Greek and Latin sources such as Polybius, Diodorus, and 
Cicero do not explicitly mention the hiring of rowers for Carthaginian ships (as they do the hiring 
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of mercenaries for the army), thus implying that like other ancient city-states of the Classical and 
Hellenistic eras, Carthage drafted its citizens into military service during times of war. In the city-
state model, the defense of the state almost always fell to the citizens, with military 
service/divisions made according to socio-economic status. Carthage, being the only city-state in 
the western part of North Africa, rarely had to recruit its citizens for territorial expansion or attack, 
at least up to the 3rd century BCE. It did, however, need to levy a military for engagements abroad, 
which meant the involvement of and participation on ships. It is probable that the primary sources 
do not mention from where the navy’s members come because Carthage was simply doing what 
all other city-states did, with the modification that most of their military efforts took place overseas 
and thus were naval in scope.70 John Lazenby, however, believes that it is impossible to know how 
the Carthaginian navy was crewed because the primary sources do not specifically say one way or 
the other. They do, however, refer to the size of the fleet and the number of men required to crew 
it.   
The standard strength of the Carthaginian Fleet was about 100-200 warships, not all of 
which were quinqueremes, though a good many of them would have been (Polybius 3.33).71 The 
fleet typically, therefore, consisted of approximately 30,000 to 60,000 men, not including the 
marine contingent.72 According to Strabo, by 264 BCE, Carthage maintained a population of some 
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200,000 citizens and foreigners.73 If this number consisted of only men (which, following 
demographic practices in the ancient world, is almost certain), and half of this population consisted 
of foreigners (because Carthage was a port city and thus many foreigners resided there), then one 
is left with 100,000 Carthaginian men all told. From these men, approximately half would have 
been both able-bodied and over the age of eighteen giving Carthage 50,000 men available to man 
the fleet. Given these numbers of available mariners, it is highly improbable that the Carthaginians 
could have manned their fleet without help: a fleet of 100 ships would have required 30,000 men, 
which would have been 60% of the adult, able-bodied male members of population, and a fleet of 
200 ships would have required 60,000 men, an impossible 120% of the population. For these 
reasons, the crews of Carthage’s ships must have included a number of allies (such as the 
Libyphoenicians), subjects, and/or mercenaries, although in what proportion is unclear.  
A comparison to other contemporary Mediterranean naval powers is instructive here. In 
the early fourth century Athenian navy, according to Moshe Amit, the core of the crew and the 
basis of the existence of the fleet were permanent free residents of Athens, citizens, and metics.74 
Even later in the fourth century, when the Athenians could no longer afford the volunteer sailors, 
conscription was drawn from the thetes—the lowest-class citizens-- and metics—resident 
foreigners.75 Alternative crew profiles, however, are apparent in the extant data on warships 
manned by the Hellenistic city of Rhodes.  Rhodian ships were crewed solely by citizens, including 
prominent men of their day and members of aristocratic families who were distinguished by their 
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wealth and active participation in public life.76 Many of the rowers in the Rhodian navy consisted 
of boys of aristocratic families who needed to obtain military experience.77 It is tempting to infer 
from these facts that Carthage followed suit, and that prominent members of Carthaginian 
aristocratic families and regular citizens of Carthage composed the crews of the Carthaginian fleet; 
however, as mentioned above, Carthage’s population was not large enough to have supplied the 
crews of the fleet in their entirety.  
Carthage must have obtained the men to crew her fleet from somewhere, and since they 
were not mercenary (given that, as mentioned above, the ancient sources which otherwise 
comment extensively on Carthaginian dependence on mercenaries for their land army are silent 
about their naval crews), one can assume they were made up of some combination of citizens and 
allies. Did the citizen element consist of aristocrats (like Rhodes) or lower class individuals (like 
Athens)? I suggest that it was some combination of both.78 Based on the behavior of the surviving 
Carthaginian crewmen after they arrived in Sardinia when they arrested and crucified Hannibal the 
Carthaginian admiral (not to be confused with Hannibal the Rhodian; Polybius 1.24.5-7), 
Carthage’s crewmen - or at least the officers - likely consisted of aristocratic citizens. Because the 
Carthaginians did not maintain an army, their young aristocrats must have obtained some military 
training from somewhere. This being the case, it is likely that the Rhodian technique of training 
the young aristocrats in their navy by letting them work their way up in the ranks was also a 
strategy Carthage employed. However, given that rowers were paid (and likely paid well), the 
rowers (if only the unskilled portion) were more probably from Carthage’s lower class citizens.79 
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Even so, the population estimates suggest that there would have been a dearth of sailors to crew 
the large Carthaginian navy, necessitating sailors from elsewhere. The logical conclusion - since 
the crews were not mercenary - is that the rest of the crews were filled by Carthage’s 
Libyphoenician allies.80 On the other hand, evidence from Athens demonstrates that many of 
Athens’ allies (besides Samos, Chios and the cities of Lisbos) did not provide men and ships but 
tribute instead,81 suggesting that the Libyphoenician allies may have had a choice in the 
contribution of men and ships to the Carthaginian cause. Perhaps the higher class Libyphoenicians 
contributed money and the lower class Libyphoenicians - those equivalent to the thetes and metics 
of Athens - became rowers by choice.   
As is probably clear from the discussion so far, it is impossible to know exactly how many 
men in the crews of the navy were actually Carthaginian citizens. My point in engaging in these 
estimates of the navy's size and composition has thus not been to create precise statistics, but rather 
to add greater substance to answering the larger question of this thesis: what was the economic 
impact of the Punic Wars? To answer that question, I have to demonstrate the overall cost of 
human, and especially citizen, lives, and a good way of doing that is to think about the implications 
of a “minimal” population estimate: that is, what would be the loss of citizen life if only the officers 
of Carthage's fleets were citizens?  If this had, in fact, been the historical reality at Carthage at the 
time of the Punic Wars, the percentage of the population serving in the fleet would still have been 
fairly substantial: at any given time, using the aforementioned number of 45 officers per ship, nine 
to eighteen percent of the population (of 264 BCE) would have been serving in the navy.82 Though 
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this portion of the population is less than the proportion of hoplites to citizens in other city states, 
it is important note that the casualties of naval warfare were much higher than those of hoplite 
warfare, in typical battles, and that this represents the very minimum amount of Carthaginian men 
on the fleet; the actual number might have been much higher, and the number of losses 
correspondingly greater on the citizen body. 
 
2.2 Building and Maintaining the Fleet 
Tarn suggests that Carthage limited the number of ships in her fleets to 200 per battle due 
to a lack of manpower to crew them.83 The numbers recorded by the ancient sources add support 
to Tarn’s claim. For example, in the first six years of naval combat (beginning with the Battle of 
the Lipari Islands in 260 BCE and ending with the Battle of Hermaea in 255 BCE), the 
Carthaginians lost 373 ships, a number that refers only to the number of ships lost in active combat 
and not those lost to storms or other natural phenomena.84 Polybius says that 500 ships were lost 
over the course of the war, though he, too, reckons only those lost in combat.85 
Large navies required enormous initial investment and their maintenance constant manual, 
material, and financial support.86 The Greek writer Isocrates (Areopagus 7.66) states that the 
Athenian ship sheds cost 1000 talents each.87 Approximately 170 ship sheds have been uncovered 
in Carthage, dated to the 2nd, or possibly 3rd century BCE.88 Constructing and outfitting a trireme 
could cost around one and a half to two talents, with 1000 drachmas being the cost for only the 
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oars. Larger ships, such as the quinquereme, would have been more expensive.89 A fleet of two 
hundred triremes would have cost 300-400 talents, and by extension, a fleet of two hundred 
quinqueremes would cost significantly more than that.90 Part of this cost was managed by fleet 
refurbishment, with modifications and repairs being made (according to Polybius) to ships 
captured in battle.91 However, the loss of 500-700 ships, despite being spread over 24 years, still 
drained state resources during the First Punic War, and provides evidence that the costs of naval 
warfare could exhaust even the most prosperous of states.92  
As mentioned above, some scholars suggest that Carthage relied on Libyphoenician groups 
to help supply both rowers and ships.93 But unless the Libyphoenicians supplied almost all of the 
crewmen, which is unlikely, then it is probably the case that the Carthaginians contributed many 
thousands of men to their fleet. These men who served on the fleet would not have been available 
during the main agricultural season - May through September. So, not only would they be 
consuming large amounts of grain, they would not be contributing to helping grow it, causing 
Carthage to increase the demands for tribute on the Libyans and other groups. (See below).  
 
2.3 Loss of Property, Loss of Life 
In calculating the loss of these ships in terms of the total men lost with them as well, the 
overwhelming impact the First Punic War had on Carthage becomes apparent, at least on the 
population itself. Because it is more likely that the marines who were on the ships were 
mercenaries rather than Carthaginian citizens, it makes sense to limit the casualties of the 
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Carthaginians to 300 per ship.  Using this estimate, the casualties of Carthage and its allied crews 
over the first six years of naval battles amount to 111,900 men.94 Even if the Carthaginians only 
supplied the officers for the ships, the resulting number would have been 16,785 men. Given that 
the population of Carthage was approximately 200,000 people, the loss of almost 17,000 able-
bodied men in six years would have been hard to replace. It would have been even harder if the 
Carthaginians supplied more men than just officers (which is likely). Polybius says that 500 ships 
were lost over the course of the war, though he, too, reckons only those lost in combat (1.63.6). 
Assuming 300 men per ship for all but the last battle - and approximately 140 men per ship for the 
last battle (Polybius asserts that the ships during the Battle of the Aegates Islands were drastically 
under-crewed),95 the resulting Carthaginian naval casualties during the entirety of the First Punic 
War possibly amounted to 128,700 men. Piero Bartoloni asserts that the Carthaginians lost at least 
200 more ships through shipwrecks and other non-battle sinkings, bringing his total for the First 
Punic War to 700 total ships lost.96 If he is correct, this brings the total loss of men to 188,700 (an 
astonishing number considering that it does not include the loss of the mercenary-marines on the 
ships). It seems reasonable to assume that it was not only the prohibitive cost of rebuilding those 
ships that had been lost, nor just that and  the payment of the crews, but also an increasing shortage 
of manpower to crew the ships which contributed to the economic impact of the war.  
 Carthaginian citizens suffered because of Carthage’s dedication to war with Rome. 
Though the war was not fought in Carthage itself, the loss of 111,900 men to naval warfare in six 
years- many of whom were citizens - would have touched everyone in the state. Though Carthage 
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was able to call on her subject states for tribute, it was not enough to keep her citizens from feeling 
the effects of the war. During the 24 years over which the First Punic War stretched, the finances 
of Carthage changed from prosperous nation to impoverished one.  The cost of the navy, both 
monetarily and through loss of life, serves to demonstrate, in a visible way, the devastating 
ramifications of the First Punic War on the people of Carthage, and in fact may go far to explain 
that city’s performance in – and eventual loss of – its second go-round with Rome.  
 
3 COSTS OF WAR  
 In order to compose a thesis that examines the ramifications of the First Punic War on the 
city of Carthage, the expenditures of Carthage to conduct this war must be investigated. This kind 
of investigation typically falls under the umbrella of logistics. Unfortunately, though the ancients 
knew the value of logistics, none of the ancient sources actually wrote about them, and thus it is 
left to modern scholars to put together the pieces and figure out the logistics of ancient wars. With 
that in mind, in this chapter, I examine the logistical costs of war activity during the First Punic 
War, focusing on evidence supplied by Polybius and Diodorus Siculus. While Chapter one focused 
on the economic effects of the Carthaginian navy and its crews and Chapter three focuses on the 
ramifications the expenditures of the First Punic War had on Carthage, the goal for this chapter is 
to provide a broad idea of the expenditures mentioned in Chapter three. I first consider issues of 
pay and rations for parts of the army beyond the naval crews. This means a principal focus on the 
various mercenary contingents hired by Carthage over the course of the war. I then look at other 
hidden but necessary costs, namely the overall expenditure on food, equipment, and animals. I 
conclude that though it is not possible to know exactly how much Carthage spent on the First Punic 
War, it was enough to have an economic draining effect on the city. 
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3.1 Manpower Costs 
 As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, a large part of the Carthaginian army was 
made up of mercenary groups. These mercenaries were very diverse and consisted of Iberians, 
Celts, Balearic Islanders, Libyans, Phoenicians, Ligurians, and various Greek slaves (Diodorus 
25.2.2). They also included the Numidian cavalry (Polybius 1.19.2). Of these different contingents, 
the Libyans were the largest group (Polybius 1.67.7). Polybius provides some indications that 
these groups, in addition to being ethnically distinguished (1.67.3), were also functionally 
differentiated in terms of the types of fighting they conducted when he describes Xanthippus’ 
organization for the Battle of Tunis. He places the “most active mercenaries together with the 
cavalry in front of both wings (1.33.6-7,)For instance, in the Carthaginian army, the infantry was 
composed of the Libyan and Iberian mercenaries (and probably the Greek slaves that Diodorus 
mentions), though Libyans could also make up the cavalry as well (Polybius 3.33.15). The 
mercenaries from the Balearic Islands were slingers - men who essentially hurled missiles into the 
enemy troops by means of a sling (Polybius 3.33.11).97  There were also various cavalry groups 
made up of Numidians, Libyans, and cavalry from Spain (3., along with mahouts for the elephants 
(1.40.15).98  
Pay for mercenaries likely varied depending on the particular job that the mercenaries held. 
These amounts can be inferred by examining Hellenistic sources that record the payments supplied 
to Greek mercenaries and soldiers, which would have been contemporary and thus analogous to 
what Carthaginian mercenaries were paid.  Typically, rates of pay for mercenaries ranged from 
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three obols a day to two drachmai per day for a standard hoplite (infantryman); from four obols to 
five drachmai per day for cavalrymen; and from two or three obols to one drachma per day for a 
sailor.99 However, an inscription from Epidauros in 302 BCE stipulates the fines to be paid by 
cities for failing to provide the levy of soldiers for which they were responsible. According to 
David Pritchett, it has been maintained that the fine represents ten times the pay of the soldiers in 
question. This allows the historian to reconstruct the pay of hoplites, cavalry, and sailors at this 
time period as two drachmai per day for the hoplite, five drachmai per day for the cavalry and one 
drachma per day for the sailors.100 Carthage probably offered its mercenaries payments that were 
comparable to these rates, particularly given the competition among different states for 
mercenaries across the Mediterranean during the Hellenistic period. However, several fragments 
of papyrus dated 280-240 BCE reveal that Greek mercenary pay varied according to the political 
and economic climate.101 If the climate was good, the pay would be good. The pay would decrease 
if the political and economic climate was bad or uncertain. Indeed, Polybius reports that Carthage 
attempted to negotiate the amount of money owed to the mercenaries at the end of the First Punic 
War due to the “heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage,” lending support to the notion 
that the rate that mercenaries were paid varied with the economic conditions of the state they were 
serving (1.67.1). Carthage’s economic state at the time of the Mercenary Wars was so bad that 
they felt it necessary to attempt to rescind their previous agreement and renegotiate another one, a 
less economically devastating one. 
David Pritchett has shown that different types of mercenary pay are mentioned in the Greek 
sources. These different types of pay were misthos and sitos. Misthos was payment by wage or 
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salary and was paid by the month; according to Pritchett, it represented the soldier’s pay for the 
entire month and included rations. Sitos, by comparison, was payment only by rations, and 
specifically of grain. The question of how the Carthaginians paid their mercenaries— whether they 
paid them a salary that included rations, whether they were given rations separately, or whether 
they were provided with grain— helps determine how much the Carthaginians really paid for their 
mercenaries. If they paid their mercenaries a salary that included rations, they would necessarily 
have paid the mercenaries more than if they had provided them with only grain or with ration 
money. Wartime makes food-costs go up. If Carthage was responsible for providing for the 
mercenaries, they would have had to eat some of those costs. In other words, providing all of the 
mercenaries’ food would have cost Carthage more than providing only ration money. Polybius’ 
use of the word opsonion does not really help to find an answer as opsonion can mean salary, but 
can also mean rations. Matthew Trundle states that the word opson from which opsonion comes 
was seen as a rich food group which accompanies wine or grain.102 That Polybius used this word 
suggests that the money that the mercenaries received was meant to be spent on rations. In fact, 
supporting evidence can be found throughout Polybius’ narrative of the last battle and the 
complaints of the mercenaries during the Mercenary War. For example, when the Carthaginians 
heard that the Roman navy was stationed in Lilybaeum, they hastened to send supplies to their 
mercenaries so that they could be well fed (1.60.2). Another example comes from earlier in the 
war during the siege of Lilybaeum (250 BCE) when the Carthaginians sent their Admiral Adherbal 
with a large number of ships carrying grain and money to the besieged Lilybaeum (Zonarus 8.15).  
 How, though, did the Carthaginians distribute this food that they brought? Pritchett 
suggests that there were three ways that Greek mercenaries obtained provisions: first, that they 
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were provided rations in kind, when the soldiers’ initial supply (which they were required to bring) 
was exhausted and the needs of the expeditionary force could not be satisfied by foraging; second, 
that soldiers were advanced their money at the beginning of the month with which they purchased 
their food. When on campaign, the hegemon might provide a temporary or permanent market 
where soldiers could buy their own provisions; or third, that no payment was made and the army 
and navy would be expected to live off the land or by depredation.103 Though the last option was 
a common practice in ancient Greece (based on what Polybius writes), it seems to have been 
unexpected, and in the few cases mentioned, often caused mercenaries to revolt or desert to the 
other side.  
 Evidence from right before the Mercenary War supports the theory that the Carthaginian 
mercenaries were supposed to be supplied with food or at least with money to buy food. Polybius 
states that the Carthaginians provided “lavish supplies” that the mercenaries could buy “at any 
price they were willing to pay” during the time that they were waiting idly for the pay owed them 
after the First Punic War (1.68.5). Yet other evidence suggests that the Carthaginians must have 
provided the mercenaries with rations of grain as well. Polybius reveals that [the mercenaries] 
maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable 
time at the highest price grain had stood at during the war (1.68.9). In other words, if they were 
not going to get the grain ration owed to them, then they should receive pay money in its place, at 
the inflated rate of the cost of grain during the war.  
 An important issue in estimating the overall costs of manpower for the army is thus the 
question of how much food was required for the mercenary contingents of the Carthaginian army. 
This question can be assessed first on the micro-scale level by estimating the food requirements 
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for an individual soldier. Jonathan Roth extrapolated the daily caloric need for an ancient Roman 
soldier to be approximately 3000 calories. He based this assumption off of the U.S. Army standards 
for a soldier who is approximately 170 cm tall, of medium build, weighing 66kg, and 30 years old. 
This is because men in the Roman army would likely have been older, and men in the ancient 
world were, for the most part, shorter - somewhere between 5’4” and 5’7” tall.104  If the 
Carthaginian mercenaries were taller, approximately 5’9”, 105 then, based on U.S. Army 
calculations, they would have needed approximately 3200 calories per day.106 These caloric needs 
would have varied depending on whether the men were on the move or stationary. They also would 
have been greater immediately preceding a battle, as even the ancients knew that the physical 
demands of marches and hand-to-hand combat were substantial and soldiers were said to fight less 
effectively having skipped a meal before battle.107  
 Roth states that soldiers in the Roman army received approximately 1.75 -2 pounds of 
wheat per day (they did not receive barley because that was reserved for the animals).108 If 
approximately the same amount is assumed for Carthaginian soldiers, then each soldier would 
have required approximately 52.5 to 60 pounds of grain per month. Yet the Roman military diet 
was known for being diverse. Frontinus notes that the Roman army “consumed foods of all kind” 
(2.5.14). Plutarch mentions the inclusion of lentils and salt in the Roman military diet when he is 
relating bad omens before M. Licinius Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae in 53 BCE, and Appian extols 
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the value of a mixed diet when he reveals that living on grain alone, without wine, salt and oil, was 
detrimental to the health of Roman soldiers (App. Hisp. 9,54). The Roman army was also provided 
with salt-pork as a non-grain portion of their ration.  In sum, based on the previous sources, the 
Romans provided their soldiers with grain, salt pork, wine, salt, lentils, and likely vegetables for 
variety. It is likely that the mercenaries were responsible for the variety in their diet. Like the 
Romans they could not have lived on bread alone. Thus, they either gathered it or bought it from 
the merchants who followed the army on campaign, 109 or they were provided these rations from 
the Carthaginians themselves. Whether the Carthaginians provided these sorts of rations free of 
cost to their men can only be imagined, but, as mentioned above, after the war the Carthaginians 
provided them with “lavish provisions” that they could purchase (Polybius 1.68.5). Carthage also 
provided the men – as they were waiting on their pay – “a gold stater for pressing expenses” 
(Polybius 1.68.6). Yet the mercenaries were not happy with only this arrangement. Polybius 
provides evidence of a grain ration provided by the Carthaginians when he reveals that the 
mercenaries “maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a 
considerable time at the highest price corn had stood at during the war” (Polybius 1.68.9), The 
mercenaries were aware that the price of grain varied throughout the war. It must have dropped 
after the war, leading the mercenaries to request compensation in a total that was equivalent to 
what they could have gotten when they were owed. Thus, Carthage may have saved money by not 
providing grain to the soldiers during the war, but they were not going to get away with giving the 
mercenaries less than what they were owed. It was not the rations themselves that the mercenaries 
wanted, but the value of the rations. This would have meant a higher cost for Carthage.  
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 Another major cost for Carthage that was entailed in the maintenance of the mercenaries 
and army was in supplying the army camp followers. Using evidence from Alexander the Great’s 
armies after he allowed his men to marry (Justin 12.4), Donald Engel has argued that there was at 
least one camp follower for every three soldiers.110 Polybius, when describing the period right 
before the Mercenary War, suggests that a similar situation may have applied to the Carthaginian 
army, including its mercenary branches: 
The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage 
there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be 
paid off. The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their 
wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases 
refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, 
so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. In anticipation then of 
this, they compelled the men, much against their will and in a manner calculated to 
cause much offence, to take their baggage with them (1.66.9). 
 
That the wives and children of the mercenaries were with them when they were forced to leave 
Carthage whilst waiting on their pay after the war suggests that they had likely been with them the 
entire time.  
 
3.2 Equipment for War 
 Along with food for the mercenaries (and their families), another public expense were the 
weapons needed by the mercenaries to conduct war.  Polybius states that the Carthaginians spent 
a portion of their tribute and tax money on armaments.  
The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the 
produce of the country, [and] their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had 
been met by the revenue they derived from Libya (1.71.1) 
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In this passage, Polybius does not specify whether the expenditure on armaments included actual 
weapons and armor for soldiers/mercenaries, and the evidence for Carthage’s approach to armature 
is mixed. One position is that the states that hired mercenaries to work for them provided their 
equipment.111 If this was the case, the expense for Carthage would have drastically increased.  
Another position, however, is that the broad diversity of mercenary groups hired by Carthage 
would have prevented them from adequately equipping all parts of the army and all mercenary 
contingents equally.  A compromise between these two positions might be along the lines of what 
has been suggested by Lazenby, which is that at least part of the mercenaries were homogenized 
upon entering Carthaginian service. In this instance, Lazenby means that all the different 
infantrymen would have been provided with the same weapons and armor so that Carthage could 
easily equip them. However, this would have only been the case for the infantrymen, and not for 
the others, as it is known that the Numidian cavalrymen carried a light, round, bossless, leather 
shield which was slightly convex with a narrow rim.112 These shields certainly would not have 
been the same as those carried by the infantry. There is no evidence in the sources suggesting that 
the Carthaginians actually provided the armor and weapons for their mercenaries; in fact, there is 
evidence from the Second Punic War which suggests the opposite. Hannibal outfitted his Libyan 
troops “with the choicest of the arms captured in the last battle” (Polybius 3.114.1); however, the 
Spanish and the Celts were armed differently:  
The shields of the Spaniards and Celts were very similar, but they swords were 
entirely different, those of the Spaniards thrusting with as deadly effect as they cut, 
but the Gaulish sword being only able to slash and requiring a long sweep to do so. 
As they were drawn up in alternate companies, the Gauls naked and the Spaniards 
in short tunics bordered with purple, their national dress, they presented a strange 
and impressive appearance (Polybius 3.114.1). 
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It is not beyond imagination that Carthage would have been able to replace javelins or other 
weapons of that sort if necessary, and in that sense did provide arms to their men. It is also possible 
that the arms Carthage provided to its mercenaries consisted of a variety of materiel that would 
have been needed to support the battle and the men. For instance, the Roman army took clothing, 
armor, edged weapons, missiles, tents, portable fortifications, cooking gear, medical supplies, 
writing materials, and much more.113 Only a portion of these would technically be considered arms. 
If Carthage also took such items into the field, these sorts of items would also likely be funded by 
the armaments allowance. However, this still does not cover all the equipment costs. 
 A final but major category of equipment cost, beyond the weapons for the army and the 
naval costs that were described in the previous chapter, was the material for siege warfare. These 
would have consisted of catapults (and the stones which were thrown), siege towers, battering 
rams, ballistae, and scorpions. The number of these weapons can be estimated by the number of 
weapons found in 209 BCE when Scipio seized New Carthage. He confiscated 120 very large 
catapults, 281 smaller catapults, 23 large and 52 smaller ballistae, as well as large and small 
scorpions.114 Even if cities during the First Punic War did not have as many weapons, the ones 
that they did have would have required material from which to construct them. These weapons 
were not only constructed from wood. They also were made from metal. For instance, the front of 
the siege engines were lined with iron plating to prevent them from burning. So, the cost for these 
weapons included the materials, pay for the men who built them, and pay for the men to repair 
them. The Roman army required 1600 smiths and craftsmen to maintain its equipment for battle. 
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It is likely that the Carthaginian army required similar numbers. If this is the case, then the cost for 
Carthage to retain these men must have been considerable. 
 
3.3 Animal Costs  
 The expenses of war did not consist only of pay for mercenaries, food for mercenaries, and 
equipment costs, it also included the costs of the animals which were used in the army. The 
category of animal costs encompasses both the initial cost of the animal, the technology required 
to use the animal, and the cost to maintain the animal. Animals used during the First Punic War 
include horses, elephants, and pack animals.  
 
3.3.1 Pack animals 
Pack animals were one of the most important features of ancient armies due to the need of 
the army to carry provisions for their men. They also had to carry siege equipment such as ropes, 
picks, levers, scaling ladders, shovels for tunneling, and covered battering rams had to move with 
the army. Though the siege machines could be disassembled, they required pack animals and 
wagons to carry the parts.115  Wagons needed animals to pull them. Pack animals were main means 
of moving supplies in ancient armies and could consist of donkeys, mules, horses, oxen, camels, 
and elephants.116 Though elephants were included in the Carthaginian army’s supply of animals, 
camels were not. Donkeys and mules were the most common transport animals in the ancient 
period, though oxen were used for Hannibal’s army in the Second Punic War. A donkey could 
carry a 220-pound load if properly equipped, whereas a mule could carry 450 pounds. Ox drawn 
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wagons could move thousand-pound loads, but could not move very far per day or very quickly. 
Oxen also required twice the amount of food that the horses would require to pull the same weight.  
According to Richard Gabriel, Scipio’s army of 28,000 men and 1,000 cavalry who 
marched on New Carthage required 61,000 pounds of grain and rations per day to feed the troops, 
another 33,600 pounds of hard fodder for the mules, and another 11,000 pounds of fodder for the 
horses.117 The horses were fed a higher qualify fodder than the mules.118 The 8,400 mules in the 
army required 201,600 pounds of green pasturage a day and the horses another 44,000 pounds.119 
That Scipio’s army required that many pack animals and that much fodder gives one an idea of 
how many pack animals could have been required for the Carthaginian army in the First Punic 
War. Though a better idea could be gained through Jonathan Roth’s analysis of the number of pack 
animals required. He states that a Roman legion during the Second Punic War had 1,400 mules, or 
1 animal for every 3.4 men. According to Richard Gabriel, 1,400 mules could carry 175 tons of 
food.120 Much of this food would have been fodder for the animals, as this was the largest logistical 
requirement of an ancient army. To get an idea of the extent of this need, 10,000 animals required 
247 acres of land per day to obtain sufficient fodder. During the Battle of Tunis, the Carthaginians 
had twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and almost one hundred elephants. By employing 
Roth’s calculations of 1 animal for every 3.4 men, the infantry alone would have required 
approximately 3,500 mules to transport their supplies. The cavalry would have required another 
2,000 mules to carry their supplies.121 By including the mules that would have been needed to 
carry supplies for the horses, with Roth’s calculations of 1 pack animal for every two cavalrymen. 
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That means that for this battle, the Carthaginians would have had approximately 9,600 animals 
with them. This includes the elephants, but not the food for the elephants. Elephants would also 
require fodder and thus the Carthaginians would likely have required other animals to carry their 
food as well. An African Bush elephant consumes 400 pounds of food per day, and though they 
are larger than the elephants that the Carthaginians used (the African Forest Elephant), they 
provide an idea of the type of food consumption that the Carthaginians would have experienced 
while using elephants. Gabriel states that the Carthaginian armies, while in Spain during the 
Second Punic War, had to transport their forage.122 One can assume that they had to transport 
forage for the elephants during the First Punic War as well.  
 
3.3.2 Elephants 
 The Carthaginians likely became acquainted with elephants through interactions with 
Pyrrhus of Epirus, in approximately 278 BCE. They then paid professionals to capture elephants 
for them throughout north Africa from around the Atlas Mountains, Morocco, and Algeria.123 The 
elephants caught here were the forest variety, like those captured by the Ptolemies’ in East Africa; 
smaller than African Bush Elephants. Carthage built stables in the walls of the city which would 
house 300 elephants. They also hired “Indian” mahouts. These mahouts may have actually been 
from India, and if so were obtained through the Ptolemies’ who hired mahout from India to train 
their own men. Carthage must have taken the same approach because coinage found there 
sometimes shows elephant riders with African features. Numidians were among mahouts riding 
elephants during the Second Punic War.124  
                                                 
122
 Gabriel, 56. 
123
 John M. Kistler, War Elephants, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 98.  
124
 Kistler, 97. 
44 
 Along with the price that Carthage paid to the men who caught the elephants - which we 
do not know - and the cost to feed elephants (approximately 400 pounds of fodder per day), other 
expenses that Carthage would have had to front in order to use elephants would have revolved 
around the equipment that was required to use them in battle and the training for the elephants. 
Scholars disagree whether the Carthaginian elephants that were used in the First and Second Punic 
Wars carried towers. These towers would have sat on the back of the elephants and would have 
been big enough to carry four men (Livy 37.40.4). It is believed that the Carthaginians used African 
Forest Elephants for their wars.125 These elephants are smaller than both Indian and African Bush 
elephants, and thus some scholars believe that they would not have been large enough to carry 
towers, and the mahouts would have simply ridden these elephants with their legs on either side 
of their necks.  However, Zonaras, when narrating the Second Punic War, relates that, at least 
during this war, soldiers fought from towers on the backs of elephants (VIII.13). If this was the 
case during the First Punic War as well, then the towers would have added to Carthage's elephant 
cost. Further evidence suggesting the Carthaginian use of towers for their elephants comes from 
Lucretius, who states, “In the process of time the Carthaginians taught fierce elephants, with towers 
on their backs, and with snake-like proboscis, to endure the wounds of war, and to throw vast 
martial battalions into confusion."126 
Other elephant gear would have consisted of the ankhus, carried by the mahouts and 
involving a sharp hook on a pole with which they steered the elephant, a small shield, and a quiver 
of javelins used against enemies on the ground.127 A mahout would have also worn a bronze helmet 
which had a brim in the back to guard against sunburn and a cloth wrapped around the helmet to 
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reduce heat.128 In addition, the elephants themselves also wore sets of armor. According to Appian, 
the elephants wore dyed leather armor with which the attempted to frighten the Romans (App. 
Punic Wars 43), and they may have worn iron armor on their heads, as the elephants in Antiochus 
III's army did (Livy 37.40.4).129 
It is important to understand that the Carthaginian elephants did not come to them battle 
ready, and time was needed to train them (and during this time, the Carthaginians would have 
needed to feed them). At least some of this time must have been spent in the battlefield. Polybius 
states that Hasdrubal spent time in Sicily, before the Battle of Panormus drilling his elephants. 
This must have entailed getting the elephants used to military noises. The easiest way was to repeat 
the sounds over and over again until the elephants became accustomed to the noise. The mahouts 
had drums and other instruments beaten nearby, while men practiced their combat skills. The 
sounds of swords clashing against shields, lance striking armor, arrows flying into targets, and 
frightened horses neighing were all practiced within earshot of the elephants so they would not 
become confused and frightened during the real battle.130 
  
3.3.3 Horses 
 Though the Carthaginians purchased their elephants (or at least hired someone to catch 
them), the question must be asked whether they provided the horses for the cavalry. As illustrated 
above, the Carthaginians had a large number of cavalrymen and they came from different locations. 
The Numidians made up one location, but there were Libyan cavalrymen as well. Based on an 
excerpt from Polybius when he is describing the time leading up to the Mercenary War: “When, 
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therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked 
for the value of the horses they had lost. This also was conceded …” it can be assumed that the 
cavalrymen provided their own horses, and normally would not have gotten pay for their losses, 
but given the situation - the Carthaginians were conceding to every request to keep them pacified 
- they asked for pay for their lost horses, and the Carthaginians conceded. Even though the 
Carthaginians did not provide the horses for the cavalry, they still had to provide the food for these 
horses throughout the war, and given that Carthage had a large number of cavalrymen, it would 
have made up a significant cost during the war.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was not to give specifics about the amount of money that 
Carthage would have paid to conduct the First Punic War, but to provide an idea of the things on 
which Carthage would have had to spend money. The compilation of the costs of supplies, 
equipment, manpower, and animals required for this war provide a background for understanding 
why the war affected Carthage in the way it did. The Carthaginians did not only have to provide 
ships and the men to go with them, but the many other components of war which have been covered 
in this chapter.  
 
4 THE ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PUNIC WARS ON CARTHAGE 
At the beginning of the Punic Wars, the city of Carthage was a well-established trading 
and naval power in the Mediterranean, one with control over numerous subject states. These 
subject states provided tribute to support the citizens of Carthage in the form of agricultural 
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produce.131 This was over and above what the Carthaginians themselves could produce by way of 
foodstuffs: benefitting from the robust agricultural production of their own hinterland, the 
Carthaginians were able to contribute substantial amounts of grain to the trading market.132 
Furthermore, the location of the city made it an ideal distribution center for trade from all over the 
Mediterranean.133 As such, Carthage derived significant profit from harbor fees and taxes, and was 
able to become immensely wealthy. Yet despite these assets at its command, by the end of the First 
Punic War, Carthage was scrambling from lack of resources. As might be anticipated, the needs 
of twenty-four years of warfare had taken a toll on Carthaginian food supplies, to the extent that 
the Carthage had been compelled to squeeze as much agricultural produce from its subject states 
as was possible. It was not only agricultural produce that was lacking, however; it was also funds, 
as the aftermath of the war - a messy war with their own mercenaries, who rebelled due to lack of 
payment - makes clear.134 The expenditures which led to these straitened circumstances, and the 
distress which they created, are worth a more thorough investigation. It will be the aim of the 
chapter to conduct such an investigation, which it will accomplish by an examination of the broader 
economic ramifications of war costs for Carthage, the climate of its economic system, resource 
scarcity, and currency debasement seen in the numismatic evidence from the period of the First 
Punic War.  
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4.1 Tribute: An Essential Contribution  
One of the fundamental features of the ancient Carthaginian economic system was its 
reliance on tribute payments. The collection of tribute from dependent states was common in the 
ancient world. Precedents of this sort of collection could certainly be found in earlier imperial 
models like that of the Lydians (Hdt. 1.6.2, 27.1) and their successors the Persians (Hdt. 3.89-96, 
6.42.2). The Persians, for their part, funded their wars by requiring each of their subject states to 
pay an annual tax (phoros) which was based on an assessment of what it could afford.135 This 
model is one with which the Phoenicians, the parent people of the Carthaginians, would have 
experienced first-hand, and certainly one with which the Carthaginians would have been familiar. 
By the Classical period, an additional model for tribute collection was devised by the Athenians 
in their formation of the Delian League in the aftermath of the Greek defeat of the Persians in 479 
BCE. Initially the Athenians did not collect “tribute” from dependent states per se. Rather, those 
states who wished to join a defensive alliance - the aforementioned Delian League - but did not 
wish to contribute men and ships to Athens could pay tribute (or phoros) to Athens instead, 
providing the funds that kept the Athenian fleet afloat. During the Peloponnesian War, the 
Athenians could count on receiving 600 talents per year from tribute and were able to borrow 
money from sacred treasuries.136 Despite the enormity of this income, the Athenians eventually 
came to struggle with shortage of funds the longer the war continued. To put it another way: even 
the large amounts of tribute that Athens collected from the other members of the league was not 
enough for extended periods of warfare, 
Throughout its history, Carthage also required a certain amount of tribute from most of its 
subject states. This tribute often took the form of agricultural produce, which was used to help feed 
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the Carthaginian population in times of peace and was crucial for maintaining food supplies in 
times of war.137 Though treaties established the level of tribute for some subject states, the 
Carthaginians varied and altered their assessments upon others according to choice or necessity.138 
For example, some places, such as Sardinia and Corsica, may not have been obliged to pay tribute 
at all, or if they were, there is no extant record of it (more below).139 The same appears to have 
been the case for western Sicily, which the Carthaginians did not value for its grain production but 
for rather for the ports of Panormus and Lilybaeum.140 But other states did pay, specifically by 
agricultural tithe,and principal among the latter were the Libyans. They were required to pay and 
in quantities that could be quite extensive: even before the war, the Libyans were obligated by 
their treaty to send one quarter of their crops to Carthage. As the war stretched on, the demand for 
agricultural supplies from the Libyans increased.141 Libya had become Carthage’s main supplier, 
and by war’s end they were compelled to increase their tribute payment by 100 percent.142 Notice 
of this increase comes from Polybius (1.72.2-6), who also records that the Carthaginians were 
relentless in their collection, disallowing any exemption on grounds of poverty and arresting men 
who could not pay. The Carthaginians apparently found their overwhelming dependence on the 
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Libyans somewhat distressing, as the expedition against the Numidians launched around 254 BCE 
illustrates. During this episode, as originally recounted by Orosius (4.9.9), the Carthaginians sent 
an army under their general Hamilcar against Numidia and Mauretania to punish them for their 
attack on Carthage in 256 BCE. Hamilcar accused the Numidians of having attacked Carthage on 
behalf of the Romans, and as punishment, he crucified the alleged ringleaders. He additionally, 
however, seized a thousand talents of silver and twenty thousand heads of cattle, a confiscation 
likely motivated as much by a desire to punish as by concern for overburdening the Libyans to the 
point that they would be completely useless to the Carthaginians. 143  
Despite the evidence for increased tribute demands and payments, Carthage still suffered 
from grain shortages throughout the First Punic War, shortages that had an impact on both the 
military and the citizenry.144 It became increasingly difficult to support both the civilian population 
and the mercenaries hired to fight against Rome. The question of why the Carthaginians did not 
extract grain from other territories under their sway, such as Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily, must 
thus be considered. 
That Carthage did, in fact, control these islands is glimpsed by the treaties they had with 
the Romans. One of these – the second mentioned by him as having been struck between the two 
powers, dated to “at a later date” than their first, which was established in 509 (3.22.1-13) –   
specified that the Romans could not traffic or found a city in Sardinia, and went so far as to say 
that if a merchant wound up on the shores of either Sardinia or Libya because of bad weather, he 
could stay no longer than five days (Polybius 3.24.11). It is also directly stated by Polybius, who 
suggests that Carthaginian possession of these islands motivated the Romans to aid the 
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Mamertines, so as to keep the Carthaginians from taking control of Sicily as well (1.10.7-9). 
Sardinia and Corsica were therefore almost certainly under Carthaginian control (1.10.6). That 
they could produce grain can be seen by the fact that when Romans obtained control of Sardinia 
in 237 BCE, they made use of Sardinian grain to supply their army.145 Furthermore, besides the 
exploitation of metal ores, Ameling, in a passage for which he does not cite primary sources, claims 
that Carthage’s aim in Sardinia was an expansion of agricultural production.146 Yet Carthage did 
not utilize either of these islands for their grain production.  
Two main factors may have prevented Carthage from turning to taxation of Sardinia when 
they were confronted with various economic pressures during the First Punic War. First, 
archaeological studies of the Sardinian interior suggest that parts of the island were still “native" 
possessions late in the third century BCE. Like their Phoenician predecessors, Carthage maintained 
its strongest presence along the coast-- and more specifically in the towns that had originally been 
Phoenician — and coastal hinterlands, a situation that was similarly followed in Corsica. 
Archaeological evidence suggests that even if Sardinia *was* being used for agricultural 
production, it was not prepared for being suddenly tasked with mass grain production in the middle 
of the third century BCE as most of the Punic farms that have been identified in the most grain-
productive areas of Sardinia date to the third century. These farms were fairly small – not like the 
plantations which existed in Libya – and would have, by the time of the First Punic War, been in 
place for only a generation or two.  
The second factor that likely prevented Carthage from imposing a harder tax burden on 
Sardinia is that Carthage maintained a different political treaty and legal relationship with the 
                                                 
145 Jonathan P. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War: (264 B.C. - A.D. 235) (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 160-
162. 
146 Ameling, 49.  
52 
Sardinian city-states than they did with the Libyans. Sardinian cities such as Tharros, Sulcis, 
Bithia, and Karalis were all founded by the Phoenicians, just as Carthage was. As such, they both 
shared closer ethnic ties with Carthage, ones that stressed a joint ancestral relationship with Tyre, 
and were correlatively granted certain legal, sociopolitical, and economic privileges. We know 
that this is the case largely based on the analogous evidence from Libyphoenician communities, 
cities that were also Phoenician in origin. As discussed by Walter Ameling, Libyphoenicians had 
the same rights as the Carthaginians themselves, with the possible exception that they were 
required to pay taxes to Carthage.147 It is unknown whether Carthaginian citizens themselves had 
to pay taxes, though it is likely that they had to pay a tax on their land - eisphora - like the Athenians 
and the Macedonians.148 If the Sardinians had the same status as the Libyphoenicians (and by 
extension, the same rights as Carthaginians), they were also likely excluded from levies of tribute. 
Carthage did, of course, sometimes obtain grain from Sardinia during military crises,as they 
did during the Mercenary War.149  After all, it is quite possible that the Carthaginians purchased 
this grain instead of obtaining it through their tribute system.150 However, there is no definitive 
evidence that the Sardinians supplied grain to Carthage under any circumstances during the First 
Punic War, a situation that at first glance appears puzzling given the proximity of Sardinia to 
Sicily, the main setting for the First Punic War.  The literary record, however, provides some 
explanation for why this was the case. Polybius scarcely mentions Sardinia during his narrative of 
the First Punic War, but other primary sources make mention of battles fought on Sardinia and 
triumphs awarded. The Fasti Triumphales (which documents triumphs given to Roman consuls 
and proconsuls by year) mention two instances in 258 and 259 BCE when the Romans won battles 
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against the Sardinians and the Carthaginians in Sardinia.151 Eutropius also underscores the notice 
of the Fasti, stating outright that the Romans destroyed Sardinia’s excess grain when they “laid 
waste to Corsica and Sardinia, [and] carried away several thousand captives” (Eutropius 2.20.3). 
This evidence provides a reason that Carthage did not obtain grain from Sardinia – Sardinia did 
not have grain to spare. In any case, though the Carthaginians obtained grain from the Numidians, 
Mauretanians, and other groups in Libya, they were not able to take advantage of their wide range 
of territories when faced with broader economic pressure during the First Punic War.152 
 
4.2 Economic Stress during the First Punic War 
 Though the First Punic War put stress on the economy of Carthage from the beginning, as 
wars are apt to do, major economic damage is not apparent in the sources until the last six years 
of the conflict.153 In order to understand the reasons behind this, it is necessary to explain the events 
that contributed to this economic state. Critical to such an explanation is the year 255.154 In that 
year, the Carthaginians suffered a crushing loss at the battle of Hermaeum, as was discussed in 
Chapter 1. Under other circumstances, such sustained losses might have led them to sue for peace. 
Yet in this instance peace was not sought, because other events from 255 - one earlier than 
Hermaeum, and one later - led the Carthaginians to believe that victory in the war was still possible. 
Fifteen years of war then ensued, and their costs eventually proved to be more than Carthage could 
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pay. For these reasons, 255 was a vitally important year for the Carthaginian war effort, and as 
such, a brief discussion of that year’s events seems appropriate here. 
 
 
4.2.1 Tunis and Hermaeum  
 Just before the summer of 255 a Romans army under Marcus Atilius Regulus suffered a 
beating in Africa at the hands of the Carthaginians near modern-day Tunis. According to Polybius 
(1.33-35), the Carthaginians were well served by the Spartan Xanthippus, who was given 
command of the army, and by their elephants, who broke the Roman line at the battle. Roman 
losses were truly staggering: Polybius reports that after battle of Aspis, which had been in the 
previous year, Regulus was left with 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to press the offensive in 
Africa (1.29.9).155 Of these, only 2500 escaped destruction on the field, and 500 of these were soon 
captured along with Regulus himself. Furthermore, Polybius reports that the legions were so afraid 
of the Carthaginian elephants that they avoided fighting on open ground for the next two years 
(1.39.12).156   
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The Carthaginians, for their part, were elated by their victory, and Polybius describes the 
extravagance of their celebrations and religious observances (1.36.1), andwere apparently not 
dampened by their failure to dislodge the survivors of the battle of Tunis from Aspis, which they 
held against a Carthaginian siege (1.36.5-6). He also describes the buoyancy with which they 
repaired and refitted their fleet of 200 ships (1.36.9). However, fortune seemingly turned against 
them in the next engagement, when they ran into 250 ships under the command of Marcus 
Aemilius Paullus and Servius Fulvius Nobilior that were rounding the African side of the Sicilian 
coast.157 The Romans attacked the Carthaginian fleet near Hermaeum, and were able to capture 
114 ships with their crews.  
Even this enormous setback did not dampen Carthaginian spirits, due to a catastrophe 
which directly befell the triumphant Roman fleet: after picking up their remaining survivors from 
Aspis, they set sail again for Sicily and home. On their way, they were overcome by a terrible 
storm near Camarina, in southeastern Sicily: out of 364 ships, only 80 were saved.158 Even better, 
at least for the Carthaginians, was the fact that this disaster could have been prevented: Paullus 
and Nobilior were warned that storms were probable and that safe harbors were few in southern 
Sicily. They chose to sail anyway, and thus the loss was entirely due to their bungling (1.37.4-6). 
The elation of the Carthaginians at the misfortune of the Romans might be seen in what Polybius 
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Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaeum promontory they fell on them and easily routed them, 
capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews. Then having taken on board at Aspis the lads who 
remained in Libya they set sail again for Sicily. They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of 
Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to 
describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were 
saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, 
covering the shore with corpses and wreckage.” (Polybius 1.36.10-37.3).  
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(1.38.1) says was the attitude of the Carthaginians; that is, that the devastation of the Roman ships 
and the win in Africa convinced them that they were equal to Rome on both land and sea. In the 
same passage, Polybius also relates that the Carthaginians began making additional military and 
naval preparations. They sent Hasdrubal, 140 elephants, the troops from the previous engagement 
in Africa, and a force that had joined them from Heraclea towards Sicily. They also began to make 
preparations for a naval expedition, preparing a force of 200 ships (1.38.2-5). Optimism, it can be 
imagined, must have run high. 
 
4.2.2 Timing Issues and Economic Concerns 
 A sober estimation of the events of 255 BCE reveals that the Romans had suffered colossal 
losses: at least 13,000 infantry and cavalry had been killed or captured at Tunis, and over 280 ships 
had been lost with all hands aboard159. That the Carthaginians became encouraged is 
understandable, though misplaced. While the land victory at Tunis was impressive, it was won by 
the Spartan general Xanthippus, who soon left Carthage for Sparta, purportedly fearing the 
jealousy that might accompany his famous exploit (1.36.2).160 Furthermore, the Carthaginians had 
proven themselves unable to dislodge the survivors from Tunis, who had retreated to Aspis and 
successfully held out against a Carthaginian siege (1.36.6-7). Additionally, the fact that the 
Romans had lost so many ships in 255 did not mean the Carthaginians had sunk them. As noted 
above, the Romans lost their fleet because their commanders had chosen to ignore the storm 
warnings. As a famous passage in Polybius (1.37.7) makes clear, they had chosen to rely upon 
force rather than prudence, and attempted to muscle their way through the storm, destroying their 
                                                 
159 It may well have been that the number killed at Tunis was much greater; see earlier note. 
160 Polybius also hints that there is more to the story of his departure. Cassius Dio (in Zonaras 8.13), Appian 
(Pun, 4), Silius Italicus (Pun. 6.680-683), and Diodorus Siculus (23.16) all indicate that Xanthippus was murdered 
by the Carthaginians, who gave him a ship they knew to unseaworthy to take him back to Greece. 
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own fleet in the process. The Carthaginians benefitted from Roman stubbornness, but relying upon 
enemies to defeat themselves rather than actively defeating them is a dangerous strategy, since 
there was always the chance that the enemy might always elect to stop their self-destructive 
behaviors.  
Furthermore, the Carthaginians had themselves hardly emerged from 255 unscathed. 
Although Polybius reports fairly low Carthaginian casualties at Tunis (a mere 800 mercenaries; 
1.34.9), the Carthaginians proved unable to take the survivors, who had retreated to Aspis (1.36.6-
7). This was not from want of trying. Polybius states that the Carthaginians had put Aspis under 
siege soon after Tunis, but the courage of the Romans proved too much for them, and they were 
forced to abandon the siege at length. Polybius does not mention how long “at length” (télos) was. 
He does assert that Hermaeum happened within the same year. Polybius does not explain why the 
Carthaginians were unable to outwait the Romans and take Aspis, but the literary record indicates 
that the Carthaginians were beginning to suffer from shortages of manpower. At issue is the timing 
of Hasdrubal’s dispatch to Sicily. Polybius states that the Carthaginians sent Hasdrubal and his 
elephants to Sicily immediately after the Romans suffered the destruction of their ships in 255, but 
some modern scholars have suggested that this was not the case.161 The argument hinges on the 
fact that the Romans took Panormus without strenuous effort in 254, left the town with what 
appears to be a small garrison, and held it unopposed for over four years until the counterattack 
came in 250 BCE.162 Polybius does indicate that Hasdrubal took some time to train his forces, but 
that Hasdrubal simply let the assault and seizure take place without challenging the Romans is 
                                                 
161 Lazenby, 113. 
162 Polybius (1.38.7-10) and Zonaras (8.14, quoting Cassius Dio) cite its capture by Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio 
and Aulus Atilius, with Polybius explicitly stating that the two were consuls at the time, hence 254. The 
counterattack came when Hasdrubal moved on Lucius Caecilius Metellus, who is indicated as proconsul in Polybius 
(because the counterattack on Panormus - 1.40.1-16 -  is mentioned after the election of consuls Gaius Atilius 
Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso, which occurs in 1.39.15), and thus 250. 
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unlikely given Polybius’ stress on the importance of Panormus (1.38.7), and especially when it is 
taken into consideration that Hasdrubal was not immediately called back to Carthage and put to 
death, as was Carthage’s policy for generals who failed. Inactivity on Hasdrubal’s part could be 
explained if there was a delay between the sinking at Camarina in 255 and the counterattack on 
Panormus in 250.  
That Polybius was mistaken in his timing of when Hasdrubal was sent to Sicily is suggested 
in the pages of Polybius himself and Orosius. The former notes that at roughly the same time as 
the battle at Adys, the Carthaginians encountered another military challenge in the form of an 
attack by the Numidians on Libya (1.31.2). The Numidians had caused more damage than the 
Romans, he says, and Orosius notes that the Carthaginians got around to punishing the Numidians 
after. According that author, at some point after Camarina the Carthaginians sent an army to deal 
with the invaders (4.9.4). Hamilcar, the man chosen for the command, apparently had little trouble 
with the Numidians, as was discussed above. The apparent ease of his victory may have been 
helped by the fact that the men that he took with him to Numidia were the same men who had 
fought with Xanthippus. They were also likely the men that Hasdrubal took to Sicily as some of 
men, Polybius says, were not new recruits, but men who had previously fought for Carthage 
(1.38.2). It could have been that Hasdrubal may have had to wait until the Numidian campaign had 
been concluded. If it is indeed the case that Hasdrubal was not sent immediately, but after the 
Carthaginians had taken care of the Numidians, it would explain the lack of Carthaginian activity 
on Sicily during the years 254-250. It would also explain the ability of the Romans to capture 
Panormus; Hasdrubal was not there to come to the rescue, and only the garrison that was stationed 
there could defend it (more below). Carthage could not leave large garrisons in every city they 
possessed on Sicily. The Carthaginians had a limited amount of men, including the tributary 
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soldiers from their subject states (approximately 200,000 that they could field at any one time).163 
If this includes the men lost to naval activity, and assuming the highest number 128,700 lost, then 
there were approximately 21,300 men left for naval activity or to supplement their mercenary 
troops.  
 This lack of men was not Carthage’s only concern, as the loss of 114 more ships at 
Hermaeum would have been devastating as well. The cost to replace those ships - again - would 
have been staggering. It also would have taken quite a bit of time to rebuild the fleet. This helps to 
explain the fairly substantial period of time between the battle of Hermaeum and the battle of 
Drepana. The Carthaginians were unable to rebuild their navy in a three month period, as Polybius 
states that the Romans were able to do (1.38.6). Polybius stated that the Carthaginians “began to 
get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a naval expedition” 
(emphasis mine)(Polybius 1.38.3), thus implying that it took at least some time for the 
Carthaginians to prepare their fleet. 
Preparing their fleet this time would have been more difficult than it had been before. As 
mentioned in Chapter one, by the end of the Battle of Hermaeum, the Carthaginians had lost a total 
of 373 ships. They had lost 114 only in the Battle of Hermaeum. One cannot assume that they had 
an inexhaustible supply of ship building supplies at the ready. Certain parts of the ships needed to 
be constructed wood consisting of varying degrees of dryness: the sides needed to be dry to a 
certain degree or the ship would not be waterproof.164   That the Carthaginians had just finished 
constructing quite a few ships after the battle of Ecnomus suggests that their supply of wood which 
was already prepared could have been depleted and would have needed to be replenished thus 
leading to a longer preparation time for the Carthaginian fleet than for the Roman fleet. . The 
                                                 
163 Pilkington, 345. 
164 Casson, 205.  
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Carthaginians would not have constructed an entire fleet out of new wood – new wood was heavier 
and would have compromised their rowing ability and speed, something about which Polybius was 
consistently complimentary.  
 
4.2.3 The Loss of Panormus 
Upon hearing of the devastation of their fleet, the Romans constructed 220 new ships and 
conducted an amphibious mission against Panormus, the most important Carthaginian city on 
Sicily. Polybius (1.38.5-10) states that the Romans undertook the siege of Panormus complete with 
siege works and battering rams. They knocked down the towers of Panormus on the sea and 
managed to storm the New Town and convince the Old Town to surrender, after which the Consuls 
sailed back to Rome and left a garrison in the town.165  
Though the Carthaginians had lost Panormus, they managed to take back Agrigentum (a 
Carthaginian city which had been taken by the Romans), but they did not feel that they could hold 
it and so they razed it to the ground. Then, in the early summer of 253 BCE, the Romans lost 
another 150 ships sailing across open seas on their way back to Rome. Polybius (1.39) states that, 
under such conditions, the Romans abandoned the idea of constructing another fleet, (see also 
Polybius 1.59). They turned their reliance fully on their ground troops who were, it seems, (as 
mentioned above) afraid to fight the Carthaginians because of their elephants. 
The loss of Panormus was major, and would have cost the Carthaginians in terms of their 
economy; Richard Miles states that the Carthaginians would have faced the risk of economic 
                                                 
165 Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the 
Carthaginian province, they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other 
necessary preparations brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, 
the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so‑called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old 
Town being now in imminent danger, its inhabitants soon surrendered it. Having taken possession of it the Consuls 
sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town. (Polybius 1.38.7-10) 
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disaster if they lost the ports of Lilybaeum and Panormus, and even Polybius states that Panormus 
was “the most important city in the Carthaginian province”.  It was also an extended affair. Though 
the Romans controlled the port after 254 BCE, the Carthaginians did not give it up for lost until 
Hasdrubal and his army were stomped by the Romans in 250 BCE. During this battle, the Romans 
managed to capture all of the Carthaginian elephants - ten with their mahouts and the rest who had 
thrown their mahouts (Polybius 1.40.15). The battle represented a turning point in the war in that 
after it occurred, the Carthaginians devoted all their efforts to defending Lilybaeum (Polybius 
1.41.6). Polybius attributes this change in strategy to the fact that the Carthaginians would not have 
any ports on Sicily if they lost Lilybaeum. Richard Miles depicts the situation a little more starkly; 
he specifically emphasizes the importance of Lilybaeum and Panormus, making it clear that it was 
not just the loss of any port on Sicily, but the loss of a port essential to the Carthaginian economy 
that caused the Carthaginians to rethink their strategy. Losing one was bad, but losing both would 
be devastating, which is exactly why Carthage focused solely on Lilybaeum for the next nine years. 
 
4.2.4 The Siege at Lilybaeum 
Though the loss of Panormus was to make itself felt in the following years, it was not 
apparent initially (likely because the Carthaginians could still profit from Lilybaeum). After the 
win at the Battle of Panormus (250 BCE),166 the Romans decided to take to the sea again and 
conduct a siege on Lilybaeum, which was practically the last Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily.  
Surrounding the city, the Romans began attacking the towers with their siege works, 
gradually expanding their area of control one tower at a time. By the time they had knocked down 
                                                 
166 By this point, it had been four years since the horrible losses in the storms following the capture of 
Panormus.  
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six, they were able to use the battering rams on the others all at once. Though the siege was coming 
closer and the population of the city was terrified, the general, Himilco, caused the Romans great 
difficulty by counter-building and counter-mining with the 10,000 mercenaries that he had inside 
the city. Every day, he would advance to try to set the siege works on fire and suffered much loss 
of life (Polybius 1.42.8-13).167  
The Carthaginians sent fifty ships with troops - new mercenaries - to relieve their men 
under siege in Lilybaeum under the command of Hannibal (the son of Hamilcar and friend of 
Adherbal, the other Carthaginian Admiral). After coming to anchor at the Aegates Islands, 
Hannibal awaited a favorable breeze and was able to sail straight into the mouth of the harbor; the 
Romans made no effort to stop them (Polybius 1.44.1-4). Himilco, the Carthaginian commander, 
decided to make use of the fresh troops and the spirit these men had brought with them (as they 
were not aware of the situation) and make another attempt to fire the enemy’s siege works. Due to 
promises of reward for those who distinguished themselves, the men showed great bravery, but 
Himilco saw that too many were falling and called for the retreat (Polybius 1.45.1-14). The 
Carthaginian commander Hannibal managed to get his fleet out of the harbor while it was still 
night and make anchor at Drepana (about 21 kilometers from Lilybaeum). The Romans maintained 
control of their siege works and the city until a storm allowed the Carthaginians to burn them and 
the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and left the result to time. 
                                                 
167 The Romans encamped by this city on either side, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a 
stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan 
side, and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in 
knocking down the six adjacent towers, and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now 
so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished and the enemy's 
works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and 
panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town. Their general, 
Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused 
the enemy no little difficulty. Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed 
in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a 
character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fell in a pitched battle.  (Polybius 1.42.8-13).  
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4.2.5 The Battle of Drepana 
In 249 BCE, after the storm had allowed the Carthaginians to burn the siege works, the 
Romans sent extra troops to replace those who had been lost in the fires. At this point, the Roman 
Consul, Publius Claudius Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that it was time 
to attack Drepana with the whole fleet reasoning the Carthaginian admiral Adherbal would not 
suspect an attack because he was unaware of the arrival of the new crews. After obtaining the 
Tribunes’ consent, he chose the best men and prepared to sail at midnight. At dawn, when the ships 
came into view, they were unorganized as they had gotten out of formation during the night. 
Though Adherbal was taken by surprise, he nevertheless quickly regained his composure and got 
his ships together. Taking the lead, he exited the harbor on the opposite side from the Romans. 
The Roman commander, upon seeing this, ordered his own fleet to sail out of the harbor, causing 
much confusion. Though the ships, once lined up for battle, were evenly matched for a time 
(Polybius says that the marines of both contingents were the best men of their land forces), the 
Carthaginians began to pull ahead “owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training 
of their rowers”. Finally, the Carthaginians captured 93 of the Roman ships along with their crews 
and the rest fled back to Lilybaeum with their commander.168    
                                                 
168 The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, 
as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the 
heavy loss of men in the siege. On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the 
new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the voyage was but 
a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain. After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight 
unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. At daybreak when the leading 
ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight, but soon 
recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to attack, he decided to make every effort and 
incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certitude of a blockade … he quickly got under weigh and 
took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbour from that on which the 
Romans were entering.Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be 
intimidated by his attack, but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was 
partly inside the harbour, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter, he gave orders for them all to 
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After the Carthaginian win at the Battle of Drepana, the Carthaginian Admiral Carthalo was 
sent by Adherbal to attack the remaining Roman ships. After setting fire to the Roman ships 
moored in the harbor at Lilybaeum, he carried off as many as he was able and sailed off to keep 
watch for ships coming from Rome. When the Consul came into sight with his fleet around Cape 
Pachynus the Carthaginians sailed toward him as quickly as possible. Junius (the other Consul 
serving opposite Publius Claudius Pulcher) did not wish to engage the Carthaginians and thus 
changed his course to a rugged portion of the coastline and anchored there. While he was anchored, 
a storm approached and shattered the Roman fleet, thus destroying the Romans’ second attempt at 
a navy.  
The narrative of Battle of Drepana and the preceding seven years are essential to an 
understanding of the Carthaginian strategy, economic situation, and mindset going into the Battle 
of the Aegates Islands. As mentioned above, the Battle of Drepana followed several years during 
which the Romans had lost multitudes of ships; in 255 BCE, they lost all but 80 of their ships 
(including the 114 Carthaginian ships taken at the Battle of Hermaeum), and in the early summer 
of 254 BCE, they lost another 150 ships sailing across open seas on their way back to Rome. Then, 
following their losses at the Battle of Drepana, they lost another fleet to weather.  
                                                 
put about and sail out again … When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both 
the admirals, and they closed. At first the battle was equally balanced, as the marines in both fleets were the very 
best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it as they had many advantages 
throughout the whole struggle. They much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships 
and the better training of the rowers, as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found 
themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water 
and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked 
them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight 
of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. … Such being 
their difficult position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran 
ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along 
shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him. The remainder, ninety-three in number, were 
captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and 
made off (Polybius 1.49-51). 
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The literary sources suggest that after the loss of Panormus and the siege of Lilybaeum to 
the Romans - ultimately negating any Carthaginian profit from the ports - the Carthaginians began 
to feel the pinch in their economy. They requested a loan of 2000 talents from Ptolemy, ruler of 
Hellenistic Egypt, in 247 BCE, demonstrating that the war was taking its toll on them. Given that 
the Romans had decided not to rebuild their fleet again after the destruction of the ships by storm, 
the Carthaginians, in the next few years, allowed many of their crewmen to return to their homes 
believing “that the Romans would never again challenge their naval supremacy” (Polybius 1.61.6). 
169  Carthage’s knowledge of Rome’s losses (a total of 426 ships with their men in 255 and 254, 
on top of the 93 lost at Drepana and the 120+ to the storm in 249), the huge cost of rebuilding, and 
Rome’s decision to at least temporarily abandon naval strategy make Carthage’s assumption seem 
natural.170 There was little reason to anticipate Rome’s transition back to naval combat, and thus 
no reason to retain their naval crews.  
Their request for a loan in 247 BCE suggests that the decision to send the crewmen of the 
navy home was a decision made with an eye on finances as well. However, disbanding the fleet 
came at a cost. The rate of piracy increased. By 243 BCE the Carthaginians had ceased sending 
either money or supplies to Sicily to support Hamilcar and his men. Dexter Hoyos postulates that 
this was because it was unsafe to send supplies and money over sea when it would almost certainly 
be intercepted by pirates. Though this may have been a partial reason, the final naval battle of the 
war suggests that the unwillingness of the Carthaginians to send supplies stemmed from economic 
problems, not fear of piracy; and, it was likely inability rather than unwillingness.  
                                                 
169 This would have been at some point after 245 or a gradual process as up until that year Hamilcar was still 
using the fleet to ravage the Italian coasts. 
170 Some scholars speculate that because some of the ships lost were Carthaginian ships captured in the Battle of 
Ecnomus, they may have been crewed by Carthaginian sailors. If they were not, then the ships were likely crewed 
with the minimum amount of sailors possible.  
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4.3 The Neglect of the Navy 
Evidence for economic stress within Carthage is particularly apparent towards the end of 
the First Punic War, specifically in regards to the Battle of the Aegates Islands and onwards. 
Polybius provides a description of the battle that is worth quoting extensively here (1.59-61). 
Having mentioned that the Romans had come to the conclusion that the only way to end the war 
with the Carthaginians was once more to take to the sea, he describes their construction of a fleet 
of warships. In response: 
Hanno, who they had appointed to command the naval force, set sail and 
reached the so-called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as 
possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and after lightening the ships by 
disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified 
mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. 
Lutatius, learning of Hanno’s arrival and divining his intentions, took on 
board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which 
lies off Lilybaeum. … In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw 
that a brisk breeze was coming down favorable to the enemy, but that it had 
become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the sea too being 
heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the 
circumstances, but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather 
was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone 
and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather 
and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have 
to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land 
forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded 
most at that time. He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. 
… The Carthaginians seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, 
lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the 
enemy. As the outfit of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at 
the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each. The 
Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore 
all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews 
rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and 
the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. 
With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, 
were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while the crews were quite 
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untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines 
were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger 
this was. The fact is that, owing to them never having expected the Romans to 
dispute the sea with them again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected 
their naval force. [emphasis added]. So that immediately on engaging they 
had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships 
being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. The remainder raising their 
masts and finding a fair wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping 
them just when they required it. As for the Roman Consul he sailed away to 
Lilybaeum and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of 
the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners 
made in the battle numbered very near ten thousand. (Polybius 1.60-61) 
 
Polybius’s account of the Battle of the Aegates Islands is interesting for a variety of 
reasons, but one of the greatest is that he places a large part of blame for Carthage’s inattention to 
its navy:  This “neglect” is all the more striking since Polybius juxtaposes it to the major naval win 
at Drepana in 249 BCE. What exactly did Polybius mean by the “neglect” of the navy? In Greek, 
the work Polybius uses is a form of leipo a verb that can mean “leave” in the sense of  “leave 
standing,” “leave aside,” or “leave at home,” which can be interpreted in various ways. On the one 
hand, it is clear from other parts of Polybius’s narrative that the neglect was not equal to complete 
abandonment. During Hamilcar’s land battle against the Romans, for example, Hamilcar sent 
Carthaginian ships to ravage the Italian coasts as far as Cumae in hopes that it would distract the 
Romans from their attack on Sicily indicating that the navy was still active (Polyb. 1.59.6). On the 
other hand, the neglect was significant enough to force a lengthy delay in terms of Carthage’s 
ability to send ships to Lilybaeum after hearing of Rome’s sudden re-appearance off the west coast 
of Sicily under Gaius Lutatius at the beginning of the summer of 242 BCE (Polyb. 1.59). 
According to John Lazenby, it took the Carthaginians nine long months to stock ships and arrive 
to face the Romans.171  
                                                 
171 Lazenby, 113. 
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Sicily is approximately 3-4 days away from Carthage against the wind in an ancient vessel 
and ancient sailing patterns meant that Carthage would have had roughly three months for safe 
passage. Thus it must have taken longer than three months to get the supplies and ships ready to 
head out to Drepana. What was the cause of such a delay? Unlike the Romans, whose fleets had 
been destroyed, Carthage did not have to build a new fleet in order to take on the Romans at the 
Aegates Islands:in addition to the more than 90 ships they captured from Rome seven years earlier, 
they also still had the original Drepana fleet (120 ships) and other flotillas.172  The age of the boats 
was also not a major factor, as ships usually remained in service for approximately 25 years.173 
Polybius instead suggests that the delay was due to problems in the supply chain. As discussed 
above, the immediate reason for the fleet’s dispatching was the need for resupplying the 
Carthaginian land forces led by Hamilcar that were based at Eryx (1.60). If the ships were ready, 
it must have been the supplies that caused - or at the very least contributed to - the nine-month 
delay in the navy’s departure. 
Polybius also makes reasonably clear that it was not the supplies alone that the 
Carthaginians had difficulty acquiring (1.61.5); he makes two allusions to the state of the crews in 
particular. First he suggests that the crews were generally under-manned. When Hanno departed 
from Carthage for Sicily, he did so with approximately 250 supply-laden ships (Diodorus 24.11.1). 
Of these, the Romans would ultimately sink 50 and capture 70 (along with their crews), yet 
Polybius specifically mentions that the total number of captives amount to 10,000. As discussed 
previously, the demographic estimates of ancient authors always have been examined critically, 
but here Polybius’s number of captured sailors is less than what would have been normal for the 
captured 70 ships. Such a discrepancy implies that, at the time of naval engagement, the 
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Carthaginian ships had been “neglected” in the sense that they were not adequately supported with 
military manpower.174  
The second allusion that Polybius makes to the state of the crews is that they were 
“untrained” (anasketa) a term that can equally refer to either a temporary lack of preparation (and 
thus relevant to veteran mariners) or to inexperience (and thus relevant to new recruits). Indeed, 
as mentioned above, after the success of the earlier battle of Drepana, due to the high costs of 
paying the crew members, many sailors were likely allowed to go home. Men kept aboard ship 
would not have lost their conditioning so totally. Though the crews may have technically remained 
in the navy, they clearly spent their time doing something other than practicing their maneuvers. 
When the call for men went out seven years later, for men to fill 250 ships instead of 200, the 
Carthaginians were not able to obtain all of the same men who sailed for them previously, resulting 
in grossly under-crewed ships with sailors that were not trained as well as they could have been 
because they had not had practiced in many years, or had not practiced at all.  
Polybius’ description of the “neglect of the fleet” thus likely refers to the overall poor 
condition of the men; the lower crew numbers and their level of preparation for naval combat, not 
to the state of the ships in particular. Polybius states that the ships “were not in a serviceable 
condition for battle” because they were loaded, not because there was actually something wrong 
with the ships. The particular significance of Carthage’s disastrous loss of the Battle of the Aegates 
Islands, however, is how it indicates the broader economic stress that Carthage faced toward the 
end of the war. 
                                                 
174 Importantly, Polybius is not the only ancient source that gives numbers for prisoners taken during this battle. 
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early on in the war, it is not hard to imagine that the new recruits were less than fully trained when they were sent 
off on to this battle.  
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4.3.1 Treating for Peace 
It was at this point that the Carthaginians capitulated and sent an embassy to treat for peace 
(Polybius 1.62.5). It is likely that the devastation of the fleet during this battle, was the last straw 
for the Carthaginians.  They simply could not afford to keep fighting. The loss of these supplies 
would have been a devastating blow. The Carthaginians did not have a sufficient supply of arms, 
a proper navy, or the material left to construct one (Polybius 1.71.6). They would have known that 
even if they still had control of the sea, they also would not have been able to obtain more supplies 
to replace the ones lost and sustain an exhausted army of approximately 20,000 men.175 As 
mentioned before, they had used the Libyans for grain until they could not be used anymore; it is 
likely that the Libyans had none left to give.  
Given the economic state of Carthage at this point in the war - as suggested by the previous 
evidence - they also would not have been able to afford to replace the ships captured and sunk by 
the Romans or the men lost during this battle. The human casualties would have cost Carthage 
dearly, as it is probable that they were mostly Carthaginian citizens. Replacing the men lost during 
this battle (10,000 taken prisoner and using the same calculations for those ships sunk as for those 
captured 7,000 possibly drowned) would have been extremely difficult for a city-state whose 
manpower was already diminished to start.  
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4.3.2 Paying the Mercenaries  
After the war was over, the Carthaginians were ordered to pay war reparations to the 
Romans in the amount of 3,200 talents over ten years - 1,000 to be paid immediately. Due to this 
and the fact that Carthage was already hurting for money - as mentioned earlier, they had requested 
a loan from Ptolemy II in 247 which they did not receive - they were able to pay the Romans their 
1,000 talents, but they were unable to pay the mercenaries they amount owed to them. Though 
they tried to negotiate with the mercenaries to encourage them to take less than they were owed 
“due to the high tax on Carthage”, the mercenaries would have none of it. During the war, while 
in critical situations, the mercenaries had been made great promises by their generals (Poly 
1.66.12). After the war, the mercenaries expected Carthage to live up to the promises made to 
them, yet the Carthaginians were unable to do so. 
 
4.4 Further evidence of economic stress: The depreciation of money 
Other changes in the economic system are evident in the drastic reduction of electrum in 
the coinage of Carthage during the First Punic War. In the early fourth century BCE, the electrum 
in Carthaginian coinage was ninety-eight percent. Silver was similarly pure. This coinage seems 
to have been systematically debased, however; with gold electrum falling to thirty percent by the 
Second Punic War and silver electrum falling to thirty-three percent in the First Punic War.176 
Even with this reduction, Carthage was unable to scrape together the funds to pay the mercenaries.  
According to both literary and archaeological sources, Carthage was a historically wealthy 
city-state. Like other non-Greek groups in the west Mediterranean, they began to use coins 
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relatively late, and did not actually produce their first coinage until the first half of the fifth century 
in Sicily.177 Their money was originally coined in large quantities, and is believed to have been 
used principally to pay the mercenaries hired to fight for Carthage against Dionysius, Agathocles, 
and Pyrrhus.178 Matthew Trundle has stated, however, that in Athens at least, the use of coinage 
can be traced back to the adoption of the trireme as the warship of choice.179 Because Carthage 
was a thalassocracy, their  coinage was more likely tied to paying crewmen of the navy rather than 
mercenaries, since in the fifth century, Carthaginians provided their own citizen soldiers and the 
balance was supplied by her subject states.180 Either way, the Carthaginians had a cash economy 
by the early third century, as demonstrated by the ½, ⅔, and ¾ shekels that have been recovered.181 
Yet, as the city became more and more financially impoverished, Carthage began minting huge 
copper coins and billons with less than twenty-five percent silver. There is also evidence of the 
use of a fiduciary currency of stamped leather in use during the First Punic War.182 This evidence 
further suggests that the economy of Carthage became so depressed during the wars that its citizens 
could not get their hands on actual coinage. This demonstrates that the Carthaginian economy was 
even more diminished than the primary sources may suggest.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Over the course of the twenty-four years that the First Punic War was being fought, 
Carthage went from being a very wealthy state that could afford to hire numerous mercenaries to 
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defend it, to a state that could not procure the supplies to rebuild their ships or supply their 
mercenaries any longer. Interestingly enough, the sources do not state explicitly that the 
Carthaginians were struggling, but the evidence throughout the sources is strong enough that the 
state of the economy can be determined. The massive number of ships that the Carthaginians lost, 
and the massive number of men lost that accompanied this played a part, as did the loss of the ports 
of Panormus and Lilybaeum. The evidence presented in this chapter not only presents the 
economic ramifications of the First Punic War on Carthage, but the events behind them.  
 
5 CONCLUSION  
The First Punic War marked a turning point in the history of the ancient world. It marked 
the increase in power of one civilization (Rome) and the beginning of the downfall of another 
(Carthage). Rome up until this point had not ventured overseas, but now began to expand into 
Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia. Carthage, by contrast, had controlled a great deal of territory around 
the Mediterranean - including all of the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas -  and had 
been seen as a major sea power, but now became less powerful and controlled less territory than it 
had before; specifically, it lost Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily. Despite these facts, while the Punic 
Wars as a whole have been investigated in detail, there is currently only one monograph devoted 
specifically to the First Punic War by itself: The First Punic War: A Military History by John 
Lazenby. The other monographs include both the Second and Third Punic Wars. Certainly these 
other wars are of great importance, and it is not hard to grasp why several scholars have chosen to 
study the wars as a unified phenomenon. Yet the First Punic War, while obviously connected to 
the other two, is different from the Second and the Third, and repays further study as its own 
discreet event. Thus, this thesis focuses on it in particular. Yet a full narrative of the war, and a 
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complete discussion of its events, its causes of the war, and even its outcome, would be an 
enormous undertaking. Instead, this thesis has restricted its focus to the effect of the war on 
Carthage, especially the economic effect. This has appeared to be a worthwhile project, because 
while this war has been researched extensively (especially in those works which study the Wars 
collectively), most scholars approach it from a Roman perspective not a Carthaginian one. Even 
those who attempt a Carthaginian perspective ignore the economic cost of the war. In order to get 
a full view of this war in antiquity, it is important to discuss the other side - even if the evidence 
is limited – and to ask a variety of questions. By asking different questions and analyzing different 
factors – especially money – the motivations for Carthage’s actions become a little clearer.  
Such investigation has been attempted here. It has attempted to provide evidence that 
economics could be (and should be) considered as an important factor in the cause and conduct of 
the war by examining the different costs of war and their effects on Carthage. These costs resonate 
in three parts of the Carthaginian political and socio-economic system during the fourth through 
second centuries BCE: the personnel and labor invested in the navy; state expenditure on war-
making; and the long-term ramifications of the wars on Carthage’s economic structure. These three 
different components of the Carthaginian socio-economic framework have been taken as 
independent case-studies into how issues of state finance, the military, and social organization 
changed during the years 400 to 200 BCE, yet work together to provide a holistic representation 
of the impact of the Punic Wars on Carthage itself.  
At the war’s beginning, and throughout the combat, Carthage was known as a major sea 
power. Therefore, the obvious point of entry into the costs of the war was Carthaginian navy, and 
the first chapter detailed the financial burden that was required to maintain that force. It 
investigated the costs of the ships and the costs of the crews. It revealed that the Carthaginians 
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likely staffed their ships with citizens and men from their subject states, and examined what the 
loss of life that the naval battles entailed. Naval warfare, chapter one notes, was expensive in more 
ways than the casualties that losses generated. Ships needed to be built, maintained, and staffed, 
and though naval activity did not occur year round, the actual cost to maintain a navy was very 
significant.  
The war was not only conducted at sea, however, nor was their navy the only source 
expenditure borne by Carthage. Some of these other expenditures were examined in chapter two. 
This chapter looked into the (largely non-naval) cost of the First Punic War and into the logistics 
of fighting it. It examined the manpower costs, such as the price paid for mercenaries and their 
weapons, their entourages, and their food and pay. It also took stock of the animal costs (pack 
animals, horses, and elephants with their food) and the costs of the engines of war - catapults, 
siege engines, and other items with which Carthage defended itself. Some of these were not 
known precisely, but by analogy to other wars of the period in which same costs were paid – ones 
which give an idea of the price tag – it shows that the sheer amount of supplies needed would 
have translated into expenses paid by Carthage, which would have been colossal. 
The third chapter investigated the ramifications of the costs detailed in the first and second 
chapter on the city of Carthage. This chapter necessarily examined Carthage's method of funding 
the war, and went into specific events from the years from 255 BCE on which allowed an analysis 
of the economic effects that the war had on Carthage. These economic effects were revealed in the 
changes that can be seen in the Carthaginian economic system: the changes in the demand for 
tribute, inability to pay their soldiers, the drastic reduction in the electrum in coins as well as the 
lack of coins available, and the scarcity of supplies and manpower as seen in the battle of the 
Aegates Islands. The examination of the economic evidence available during the years 255 through 
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the end of the war suggests that the loss of the important port cities of Panormus and Lilybaeum 
played a huge role in shaping the economic situation that Carthage faced at the end of the First 
Punic War due to the importance of these cities in particular, and that it was this loss combined 
with the costs of war – both on the sea and on land – whose ramifications were evident on Carthage. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to further scholarly investigations into ancient Carthage 
by concentrating on the economic organization of the state during the First Punic War. It sought 
to categorize the costs of conducting a war such as the First Punic War and to portray the effects 
of the costs of the war on Carthage and to provide an image of the First Punic War from a different 
perspective: Carthage’s. This thesis does not make the claim that it was the extraordinary economic 
cost of a war that stretched on for twenty four years which led to Carthage's eventual capitulation 
to the Romans; however, it does suggest that the economic factor deserves more attention than it 
currently receives.  
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